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Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the
Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes
LARRY CATA BACKER*
ABSTRACT
Regulatory power has become fractured. Its assertion both by public and private
bodies is well known. Less well recognized is that the expression of this regulatory
power has been fracturing as well. No longer confined to positive regulation orjudi-
cial decision, the techniques for enforcing regulation are substituting for regulation it-
self. This paper examines surveillance as a mechanism through which power is asserted
and regulation effected in a world of shared public/private governance. For this pur-
pose, understanding the nature of surveillance as a technique of governance, and as a
substitute for governance itself, is a key element for understanding political authority
as it is developing. The paper focuses on surveillance as a new form of lawmaking
through which the old boundaries between the public and private, national and trans-
national, are not relevant. It explores the ways in which the construction of complex
systems of conscious and permanent visibility affects the power relationships among
states, economic entities and individuals. To understand the complexities and vectors of
surveillance is to grasp the shape of converging public/private governance in this cen-
tury. To that end, this paper first suggests an approach to the unbundling of the norma-
tive and methodological assumptions of surveillance. That approach can be usefully
divided into four aspects, normative, informatics, control, and governance, each of
which is developed in turn. The paper ends with an elaboration of the regulatory con-
sequences of the manipulation of these aspects of surveillance. Drawing on theories of
gouvernmentaliti the paper suggests the ways in which governance is increasingly
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elaborated through the techniques of its own power. The attention lavished on surveil-
lance in its many forms evidences the ways in which law, in a sense, is now expressed
through different forms.
INTRODUCTION
This article interrogates one critical aspect of complexity and fracture in reg-
ulatory power.' Specifically, it focuses on surveillance2 as a regulatory mechanism.3
I will explore some of the complexities of this regulatory mechanism in emerging
governance systems in which private entities are engaged in sovereign functions
and public entities participate in the market. The thesis of this article is fairly
straightforward: surveillance represents a complex of assumptions and objectives
beyond mere information gathering or observation. Surveillance serves both in-
strumental and substantive purposes that affect the power relationships among
states, economic entities, and individuals. 4 It is both technique and the reification
1. See, e.g., CLAUS OFFE, MODERNITY AND THE STATE 3-30 (1996). The question of the bases of
regulatory power, its complexity and fracture, has long obsessed Western thought. From the active
bureaucratism of Weber to the passive self-disciplined panopticism of Foucault the forms of regu-
latory control have proven to be flexible, subtle and multi-sourced. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Talcott Par-
sons ed., 1947); Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERN-
MENTALITY 87 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991). For a valuable analysis,
see Michael Reed, From the 'Cage' to the 'Gaze'? The Dynamics of Organizational Control in Late
Modernity, in REGULATION AND ORGANIZATIONS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 17, 43 (Glenn Mor-
gan & Lars Engwall eds., 1999) (exploring the thesis that "bureaucratic control is giving way to a
qualitatively different regime of control based on a contrasting trajectory and logic of regulative
ordering in which intensive, but remote and dispersed, scanning of organizational behavior and its
'normalizing' effects are the key features.").
2. See, e.g., JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 6-27 (1986) (looking to the late 19h century as the time in
which the technologies of control were developed sufficiently to support the development of the
modern social order in which governance, management and control increasingly conflated private
and public life).
3. Much legal academic discourse has focused on surveillance as it affects privacy rights. In this
sense, surveillance is understood solely as technique, technique with an important though inciden-
tal effect on the object of legal analysis-"privacy" or "rights." See, e.g., PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEG-
ISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 1-24 (1995). The further
development of this useful discourse is not undertaken in this article.
4. In the context of traditional analysis-the monitoring of individual behavior, "surveillance
today sorts people into categories, assigning worth or risk, in ways that have real effects on their
life-chances. Deep discrimination occurs, thus making surveillance not merely not a matter of
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of norms that shape the specific character of the gaze. Surveillance is both minis-
terial-the gathering of information-and administrative-the elaboration of
judgments of the importance of the actions or individuals observed. Surveillance
is also a function of its techniques.6 The technologies of surveillance suggest the
limits of the gaze and the scope of control through visibility. While virtually ev-
erything can be monitored, power (and the limits of power) is a function of con-
trol over the way power is understood, gathered, and used. Moreover, the power
to decide what parts of monitored activity may be revealed, extracted, analyzed,
judged, and relied on has important consequences, consequences that themselves
are the subject of further surveillance.'
Surveillance is one of the critical mechanisms of this expansion of private
power into what had been an exclusively public sphere. Increasingly, public bodies
are requiring, or permitting, private entities to monitor and report on the conduct
and activities of a host of actors. It increasingly serves public bodies as a substitute
for lawmaking. Surveillance is a flexible engine. It can be used to decide what
sorts of facts constitute information, to determine what sorts of information ought
to be privileged and which do not matter, to gather that information, to empower
people or entities to gather information, and to act on the information gathered.
In its domestic form it can be used to assign authority over certain types of infor-
mation to private enterprises and then hold those enterprises to account on the
basis of the information gathered.8 In its transnational form it can be used to con-
struct a set of privileged information that can be gathered and distributed volun-
tarily by private entities on the basis of systems created and maintained by
personal privacy but of social justice." David Lyon, Introduction to SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORT-
ING: PRIVACY, RISK AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 1-9 (David Lyon ed., 2002).
5. It affects not only the relationship among institutions, public and private, that is the subject of
this article, but the power dynamics of individual relationships as well. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE
UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 90-127 (2000) (describing the confla-
tion of public and private in the context of a sexual harassment suit involving the magazine SPIN).
6. See Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, and Population, in MICHEL FOUCAULT, ETHICS: SUB-
JECTIVITY AND TRUTH 67-71 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1997); see also infra Part IV.
7. See, for example, the essays in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE (Philip E.
Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1998) (exploring the current state of technology based privacy issues).
"At the beginning of the twenty-first century, new technologies of communication have increased
the danger that intimate personal information originally disclosed to friends and colleagues may
be exposed to-and misinterpreted by-a less understanding audience." ROSEN, supra note 5, at 7.
The relationship between technology and surveillance, between technique and object, informs a
large part of this essay.
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, codified at various places in
15 U.S.C.
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international public or private organizations as an alternative to formal regulation
and to provide a means of harmonizing behavior without law.9 Surveillance in its
various forms provides a unifying technique with which governance can be ef-
fectuated across the boundaries of power fractures without challenging formal
regulatory power or its limits. It avoids the barrier between the public and private
spheres; it substantially increases the regulatory palette of states without the com-
plications of the usual limitations of public formal lawmaking-especially those
of accountability and transparency.
The consequences of surveillance, particularly those consequences on the
shape of governance, are to a great extent a function of the character of the sur-
veillance power elaborated.'0 The principal effects will tend to promote a further
convergence of public and private regulatory power." This convergence arises
from a fracturing of traditional divisions of power. 2 A sovereign is said to lose its
character as such when it "acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the manner of
9. See The United Nations Global Compact, What is the Global Compact, http://www.unglobal
compact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html.
10. The range of public and private surveillance even on individuals provides a descriptor of the
range of surveillance as technique and its object as regulator of behavior:
You are under surveillance. Not many years ago, this statement could not have been made in a
generalized form to an unknown addressee. Today, assuming that you are an urban dweller in
a developed country, to be 'under surveillance' is a general condition. Cameras watch over you
as you journey to work, registering your number plates or recording your behaviour on the
underground train platform. Your image is recorded by every ATM you use, in almost every
convenience store you enter, and many times on virtually every street you walk along. Vast com-
mercial data banks assess your shopping habits and your credit history. Intergovernmental net-
works analyse your phone conversations, searching for key words as indicators of subversion.
Your boss is probably recording you too. Your neighbours can now buy satellite pictures of your
back yard. In New York, even the police dogs carry cameras. 'You are under surveillance' is no
longer an announcement made to a selected individual-it is a description of our culture.
JOHN E. McGRATH, LovING BiG BROTHER: PERFORMANCE, PRIVACY, AND SURVEILLANCE SPACE 19
(2004)(footnotes omitted).
11. There is a substratum of classical totalitarian theory about this rush toward surveillance.
Totalitarianism can be understood as grounded in a basic conflation of the individual and her
network of social relations in "a substantive identity between collective and individual interests."
A. JAMES GREGOR, THE IDEOLOGY OF FASCISM: THE RATIONALE OF TOTALITARIANISM 339 (1969)
("Apart from social relations there is strictly speaking no individuality, no personality, no human-
ity."). The irony, of course, is that the most successful application of the totalitarian aspects of
surveillance culture might well be the states whose self-identification is grounded in a rejection of
the totalitarianism, the techniques of which it has been increasingly deploying.
12. But, as Ralf Michaels and Nils Jansen caution us, this area is conceptually fraught with un-
certainty. Even the basic understanding of core terms has a certain fluidity that complicates discus-
sion. See RalfMichaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization,
Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843 (2006).
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a private player within it."'3 The reciprocal principle has not been accepted de
jure; a private actor is not said to lose its character as a private actor when it acts in
the manner of a sovereign. Still, private players now are required to play the role
of regulator and have sought that role for themselves de facto. 4 And, increasingly,
public bodies are requiring, or permitting, private entities to monitor and report
on the conduct and activities of a host of actors. 5
Surveillance, then, functions as more than a descriptor of methodology. Sur-
veillance is a new form of lawmaking through which the old boundaries between
the public and private, national and transnational, are made irrelevant. The con-
struction of complex systems of conscious and permanent visibility, as both nor-
mative systems and bundles of specific techniques, affects the power relationships
among states, economic entities, and individuals. It represents modalities of frac-
tures and complications in assertions of regulatory power, replicating its forms
and effects throughout society. 6 Its privatization tends to complicate the distinc-
tion between private and public institutions and between assertions of private
(market or personal welfare maximizing) and public (regulatory or stakeholder
welfare maximization). Surveillance cuts across borders-it embodies the tech-
niques and sensibilities of an essentially transnational response to problems of
governance. 7 To understand the complexities and vectors of surveillance is to
grasp the shape of converging public/private governance in this century.
13. Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
14. See OFFE,supra note 1, at 11-12 ("The idea that order can be achieved via the separation of
the spheres of economy and politics.., is today in both normative, and.., in descriptive terms, to
be banished to the realm of utopian or ideological delusion."). Still, this conflation, and the result-
ing sharing and movement of power between public and private institutions, troubles some. The
trouble is not the use of technology to ramp up the use of surveillance for assertions of public
power against individuals, it is the sharing of those techniques and its use by private powers for
their own benefit. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 1-15 (2000).
15. See Dara O'Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor
Standards and Monitoring, 31 POLCY STUD. J. 1, 23 (2003) ("New nongovernmental regulatory sys-
tems ... offer the potential of opening up and strengthening regulatory systems and bringing in
new voices and mechanisms for motivating improvements in global supply chains. They also har-
bor the peril of privatizing regulation, effectively closing off democratic forms of regulation and
bypassing local governance.").
16. For a feminist reading of this sort of replication at a basic level of individual-organizational
interaction, see Jennifer Robinson, Power as Friendship: Spaciality, Feminity and "Noisy" Surveil-
lance, in ENTANGLEMENTS OF POWER: GEOGRAPHIES OF DOMINATION / RESISTANCE 67-92 (Ronan
Paddison et al. eds., 2000).
17. Surveillance is thus affected by the issue of borders and by the means for their overcoming.
This is the essence of the problem of transnational law. See LARRY CATA BACKER, TRANSNATIONAL
LAW (forthcoming 2008).
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To that end, this article first suggests an approach to the unbundling of the
normative and methodological assumptions of surveillance. That approach can be
usefully divided into four aspects: (1) normative, (2) informatics, (3) control, and
(4) governance. Each of these aspects of surveillance is then developed in turn.
The focus is on the development of an understanding of the mechanical, sym-
bolic, and regulatory functions of surveillance in a context in which these func-
tions tend to leak power between private and public regulatory institutions. This
article concludes with an elaboration of the regulatory consequences of the ma-
nipulation of these aspects of surveillance. These manipulations are felt as gou-
vernmentalit6, a linking of governance with the techniques of its power.18 It serves
as a bridge between surveillance as technique and the systemic replication of pri-
vate desire in collective action. Surveillance has morphed from an incident of gov-
ernance to the basis of governance itself.
I. UNBUNDLING SURVEILLANCE
It is not unusual, when people examine issues of governance-whether pub-
lic or private-to approach the analysis in a way that embraces the value judg-
ments inherent in the normative assumptions and parallels the foundational
model of governance of the political community to which they belong. Academ-
ics, especially, practice this mode of seeing the world, often to a fault. 9
In the West, that usually translates into a fixation, of sorts, on the executive,
legislative, or judicial function. Division of government along these functional
lines is old within Western political tradition. It underlies the construction of the
apparatus of governance in the United States and most states in Europe. It has
become a basic form of governmental organization on a global scale. Even trans-
national organizations are conceived, and the value of their institutional forms is
debated, on the basis of these functional categories.0
Analysis within those functional categories is usually elaborated within a
18. Foucault, supra note 6, at 67-71.
19. See, e.g., Larry Catd Backer, The Rule of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological
Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the "Three Represents"), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Consti-
tutionalism, 16 J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2006) (discussing the difficulties of apply-
ing Western rule of law notions when the object is an understanding of Chinese constitutionalism).
20. See Welber Barral, Dispute Settlement and Legal Harmonization in Mercosur, in HARMONIZ-
ING LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND RESISTANCE (Larry Cat5
Backer ed., 2007); Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Dispute Resolution in Mercosur, available at http://
www.mercosurconsulting.net/Articles/articlel0.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
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normative framework that is bounded by efficiency concerns and fear of tyran-
ny.2' Efficiency concerns are usually expressed in terms of separation of powers
analysis.22 Fear of tyranny is usually expressed using the imagery of "checks and
balances." Americans have been increasingly interested in separation of powers
jurisprudence. The jurisprudence of assertions of functionally differentiated
power23 is an important aspect of American governance in the last half of the
twentieth century. And it has tended to inform attitudes toward a mechanics of
that expression of power in surveillance.24
Checks and balances, on the other hand, at first blush suggest an inefficiency
of sorts. It erects blocks on the efficient use of functionally differentiated power.
Thus, the executive may not enter into treaties without the advice and consent of
the Senate.25 Nor can the legislature pass an act without the approval of the execu-
tive or by the consent of an overwhelming majority of its members.26 Yet, checks
and balances also speak to efficiency concerns; not to the efficient deployment of
partial governance power (executive, legislative, or judicial), but to the efficient
deployment of legitimate governance. 7 Checks and balances are sometimes
thought to be viewed as less compelling than the efficient expression of particular-
ized and functionally differentiated power in the executive, legislative, or judicial
organs. The tensions among separation of powers and checks and balances-that
is, between efficiency concerns in governance and fear of tyranny in the assertions
21. These ideas are basic to American constitutional case law. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); McColloch v. Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
22. The debate over the implementation of a "unitary executive" theory in American constitu-
tional law provides an excellent example. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1992).
23. On functional differentiation in this context, see Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutional-
ism: Alternatives to State-Centered Constitutional Theory, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CON-
STITUTIONALISM 3, 13-15 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004).
24. See, e.g., Bob Barr, Post 9/11 Electronic Surveillance Severely Undermining Freedom, 41 VAL.
U.L. REv. 1383 (2007).
25. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
26. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
27. Checks and balances thus can be characterized as a certification of legitimacy in accordance
with the foundational governance norms of the system-democratic, participatory, and rule
bound. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-For-Hostages,
"Orderly Shutdowns," Presidential Impeachments, And Judicial "Coups," 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
PoL!Y 503, 505-14 (2003). For its relevance to supra-national governance, see, for example, Fritz W.
Scharpf, Problem-Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU 3-4 (Max Planck
Inst. for the Study of Societies, Working Paper No. 03/1, 2003), available at http://www.mpi-
fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp03-1/wpO3-1.html.
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of governmental power-have spilled over into debates about the construction of
supranational organizations."
Thus bounded, the system is expressed in both formal systems and positive
law making. These formal systems are constituted as an autonomous apparatus,
institutions vested with the authority to exercise power on behalf of stakeholders
who constitute the governance community, yet separate from these stakeholders."5
Positive law making is generalized under the rubric-"rule of law."3 It serves as
the mechanics of expressions of autonomous institutional power deployed on be-
half of the governed by institutions with power over, but autonomous and distinct
from, the governed.31 Governance is consequently limited to the juridico-legal
mechanics through which it finds expression in acts of the sovereign or its corpo-
ratist delegee.32 It becomes its means of expression (law) and its physical manifes-
tation (government), as a juridical technique through which all else is subsumed."
This provides the conceptual filter through which everything else is understood.
Taken together, then, governance is filtered through an ideological lens that
understands power as residing in a functionally differentiated and autonomous
institutional system that is expressed in positive law and optimally operational
28. Thus, for example, the applicability of both concepts has informed discussions about reform-
ing the organization of the United Nations. See, e.g., C.L. Lim, The Great Power Balance, the
United Nations and What the Framers Intended: In Partial Response to Hans Kochler, 6 CHINESE J.
INT'L L. 307, 319 (2007) ("Yet we cannot have it both ways. There is a tension between efficiency
and having checks and balances. We cannot say the Council cannot act, and at the same time say
there are no checks. The question has not to do with the absence of either but in the tension be-
tween them where these two aims must both be fulfilled, in the scheme of the Framers, in ensur-
ing the proper functioning of the Council.").
29. The constitution of "government" has been at the center of the problem of assertion of a
regularized and institutional power not only in traditional political communities, in which such
constitutions were formalized in a written instrument, but also in Marxist Leninist states, eco-
nomic communities and supra-national communities. See BACKER, supra note 20; Larry Cat.
Backer, The Euro and the European Demos: A Reconstitution, 21 Y.B. EUR. L. 13 (2002); Larry Catd
Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nation's Norms on the Respon-
sibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility as Interna-
tional Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2006) [hereinafter Multinational Corporations].
30. For a discussion of "rule of law" within the normative boundaries of American jurispru-
dence from two different and critical perspectives, see BRIAN TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN
END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW (2005) and STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 5-21 (2005).
31. See Larry Cati Backer, Reifying Law, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
32. Thus, the formal discourse of law is invoked to mask political struggle over the technologies
of control. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 145 (Robert
Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1976).
33. See id. at 87-89.
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when it operates efficiently. This approach is understood as quite reasonable and
necessary. It forms the essence of the expression and construction of the regula-
tory power of states (as sovereign political entities) and corporations (as sovereign
economic entities). It also suggests the quality of the relationship between entity,
whether public or private, and their respective stakeholders. In the case of public
entities, the core stakeholders are citizens and residents. In the case of private enti-
ties, stakeholders are security holders. In both cases, of course, there is a substan-
tial debate about the extent of stakeholders entitled to participation.34
But, other regulatory functions-for a long time lurking in the background as
incidental or secondary-have surged forward from humble beginnings in revolu-
tionary France and then Russia, to move more center stage from the late twentieth
century. In a sense, this movement evidences the transformation of those aspects of
governance, i.e., the ways in which governance is actually implemented to assume its
form that is the substance of regulation itself.35 The techniques of governance have
moved from secondary to primary organizing forces within governance organiza-
tions. "That is, technological artifacts have politics."36 They also have regulatory ef-
fect. The traditional forms of governance (through law) now serve to hide the realities
of technique as governance. This technique is supported by its own governance ideol-
ogy distinct from that of traditional governance. 7 "Shielded by the conviction that
technology is neutral and tool-like, a whole new order is built-piecemeal, step by
step, with the parts and pieces linked together in novel ways-without the slightest
public awareness or opportunity to dispute the character of the changes underway."38
Among the more important of the governance functions-affecting both public
and private governance systems-is that of surveillance. 9 By surveillance I mean to
34. In the case of public entities, for example, the question of the role of undocumented workers
has grown in importance. In the case of private companies, the role of non-shareholder stakehold-
ers has become central to the issue of corporate governance.
35. Drawing on the work of Landon Winner, Virginia Eubanks reminds us that the means or
"technics" of governance are not limited to those devices through which governance is physically ef-
fectuated. But it also includes "the activities-skills, methods, procedures and routines, or tech-
niques-and varieties of social organizations: factories, workshops, bureaucracies, armies and
research and development teams." Virginia Eubanks, Technologies of Citizenship: Surveillance and
Political Learning in the Welfare System, in SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY: TECHNOLOGICAL POLITICS
AND POWER IN EVERYDAY LIFE 89, 100 (Torin Monahan ed., 2006) (drawing from LANGDON WINNER,
AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OF-CONTROL AS A THEME IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 12 (1977)).
36. Id.
37. "Technology in a true sense is legislation." WINNER, supra note 35, at 323.
38. Id. at 324.
39. The sort of surveillance that is the object of this article is not a specific technique of observation
or monitoring, but rather the aggregation of the techniques through which the actions of people and
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invoke the French overtones of the term, to suggest that surveillance is a function of
"watching over." But watching over can be understood both as technique (how one
watches, what one watches), and as a normative system of watching (the assumptions
and justifications for watching and its production of a system of watching). Surveil-
lance, when understood as transparency, has two aspects: internal (direct stakeholders
involved in governance) and external (all communities that might be affected). In the
former sense, it can be understood as the classical forms of monitoring that have served
as the foundation of legal constructs like the duty of care in American corporate law.4"
In the latter sense, it ranges from the observation of human activity for the protection
of the state, to the observation of human activity for economic exploitation.
41
Surveillance can be said to embrace two principles. First, it embraces a passive
(openness) principle. It serves as a record keeper. Surveillance is an aggregate of
techniques for the preservation of the current as it moves into the past. It serves as
a means, made possible by increasingly effective technologies of recording and
preservation, to allow the replaying of the past in the future. This principle em-
braces the idea of potentiality-the institutional gaze.42 It is useful for recreation
of events that, projected into the future, indicate action that might be subject to
discipline. It extends the time and space for the determination of that disciplining
function.43 The past, now routinely projected into the present, remains available
through recreation, to extract consequences in the future. Yet, it does little more
than look-and record-rather than invoke a mechanics of physical coercion. 44
institutions are made transparent and observable, and on that basis subject to construction or recon-
struction on the basis of the data collected applied against the normative framework from which the
desire to observe arises. See, e.g., DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY LIFE
28-35 (2001) (surveillance and the techniques of social category sorting in governance); REG WHITA-
KER, THE END OF PRIVACY: How TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS BECOMING A REALITY 80-118 (1999) (surveil-
lance as a method of social control); Gary T. Marx, The Surveillance Society: The Threat of 1984 -Style
Techniques, THE FUTURIST, June 1985, at 21 (on the new techniques of surveillance).
40. See In re Caremark Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
41. The techniques of surveillance as transparency, that is in its aspect of making the actions of the
objects of surveillance transparent, has become increasingly automated and commodified. For a de-
scription of the differences between traditional surveillance and the new disciplinary techniques of
surveillance, see Gary T. Marx, Surveillance and Society, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL THEORY (2005).
42. Foucault famously explained that this gaze "is a machine in which everyone is caught, those
who exercise power as much as those over whom it is exercised." Michel Foucault, The Eye of
Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 156 (Colin
Gordon ed., 1980).
43. See Robert Craig, Panoptic Mediations: From Bentham's Panopticon to the P-Chip, 3 ENCUL-
TURATION (Fall 2001), available at http://enculturation.gmu.edu/3-2/craig/index.html.
44. "In contrast to that you have the system of surveillance, which on the contrary involves very
little expense. There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze .... A
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Second, surveillance includes an active (disclosure, monitoring, and assess-
ment) principle. Surveillance is not merely the gaze. It serves as well as the reifica-
tion of the borders of assertions of power over what can be seen/recorded/reduced
to symbolic significance-le regard." Surveillance in this active mode describes a
power principle that may project power in multiple directions. It shapes physical
and symbolic space.46 But, to the extent it becomes naturalized, that is, ubiquitous
in everyday human or institutional behavior, the objects of surveillance may be
the agents through which the active principle of surveillance is realized. 7
In some or all of these aspects, surveillance is sometimes characterized as es-
sential to democratic governance. It is said to further accountability. It reduces
corruption/disloyalty.49 And it serves to promote solidarity among stakeholders,
promoting management and conflict resolution. 0 It can also serve to divide, at
least in its traditional forms.5' In a global order organized as a simple state cen-
superb formula: power exercised continuously and for what turns out to be minimal cost." Fou-
CAULT, supra note 32, at 146-65.
45. This suggests an active relationship between subject and object of surveillance. That rela-
tionship was nicely fleshed out in the sense I use it here, by Lacan. See Dino Felluga, Modules on
Lacan: On the Gaze, in INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO CRITICAL THEORY, available at http://www.purdue
.edu/guidetotheory/psychoanalysis/lacangaze.html. But the gaze has an institutional component
as well. In that form, it suggests a slightly different form of internalization by the object of surveil-
lance and by its subject. See FOUCAULT, supra note 32, at 146-65 ("An inspecting gaze, a gaze which
each individual under its weight will end by interiorisation to the point that he is his own overseer,
each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself.").
46. See Hille Koskela, "The Gaze Without Eyes:" Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of
Urban Space, 24 PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 243,243-65 (2000) (arguing that "video-surveil-
lance changes the ways in which power is exercised, modifies emotional experiences in urban space
and affects the ways in which 'reality' is conceptualized and understood. Surveillance contributes
to the production of urban space.").
47. See, e.g., John Edward Campbell & Matt Carlson, Panopticon.com: Online Surveillance and
the Commodification of Privacy, 46(4) J. OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 586 (2002).
48. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,supra note 8; Paula Schaefer, Overcoming Noneconomic
Barriers to Loyal Disclosure, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 417 (2007) (analysis of mechanics of promoting seam-
less and active disclosure).
49. See, e.g., The U.S.A. Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Pub.L. No. 109-177, 120
Stat. 192 (2005). The United States Department of Justice has developed an extensive web site, the
object of which is to support the objectives and legitimacy of this statute. See Department of Justice,
Preserving Life and Liberty, http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
50. See Larry CatAi Backer, Monitor and Manage: MiFID and Power in the Regulation of EU Fi-
nancial Markets, 27 Y.B. EUR. L. (forthcoming 2008).
51. See, e.g., Alan F. Westin, Intrusions: Privacy Tradeoffs In A Free Society, 11 PUBLIC PERSPEc-
TIVE 8, 8-11 (2000). Westin explains that "In the politics of privacy, the battle is for the hearts and
minds of the Privacy Pragmatists. If most of them feel their personal information is being used
fairly and properly by businesses, especially online, they join the Privacy Unconcerned to make up
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tered system, territorially bounded and grounded in purely public lawmaking,
this relation between transparency and democratic processes can be essentially
correct. But in a global order moving toward a multi-centered, transnational, pub-
lic-private governance framework, this relationship may become more complex.
My purpose, then, is to tease out some of the possible complexities of surveillance
within the emerging multi-jurisdictional system of global law, and the emerging
relationship between surveillance and democratic governance. I then relate both
complexity and relationship to emerging public and private governance systems.
Surveillance in our time is being transformed from a general and undifferenti-
ated technique of governance to the active embodiment of governance itself. Sur-
veillance is both the repository of governance norms and the discipline of those
norms within any regulatory system. Surveillance is thus a bundle of assumptions,
factors, assessments, and actions incarnated on the bodies of the regulated. Surveil-
lance in its modern form represents another step in the perfection of social panopti-
cism, of the creation of systems of social order that are self-regulating and internalized
among those regulated. It represents a shifting of coercive power from the exter-
nal-the state, the police, and the institution to the internal-the individual and
the private. As Michel Foucault famously characterized it in another context:
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a
state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic
functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is
permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that
the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise un-
necessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for
creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person
who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a
power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.52
Thus understood, surveillance becomes self-regarding, the gaze that looks on
itself as its own reality.53 "As sociotechnical systems, then, surveillance and secu-
a 75% level of support for the existing rules and practices." Id. at 10. However, methodology mat-
ters. "But if most of the Privacy Pragmatists feel that information practices are intrusive or their
information is being misused, they join the Privacy Fundamentalists to make up a majority seek-
ing legislative or regulatory measures, or consumer boycotts." Id.
52. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195-228 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
53. See, e.g., SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY (1989).
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rity are intimately intertwined with institutions, ideologies, and a long history of
inequality.... From this standpoint, one can begin to ask the kinds of questions
worth asking and answering-questions about power."54 As normative technique,
surveillance provides the framework for its mutability, representing a complex
cluster of sub-operations whose application can substantially affect the character
of the relationship between governed and governing. Surveillance surpasses its
technique. This affects all aspects of governance, from formal political gover-
nance-like the regulation of American public corporations"5-to social gover-
nance systems-like the rankings of American law schools. 6 The gaze defines
and regulates all that it sees. 7 As a normative framework, surveillance is the ex-
pression of the behavior rules of the community for whose benefit it is applied. It
is a Logos made manifest among the community of believers. And there may be
as many manifestations of the face of divine order as there are communities in a
global system made up of multiple communities.
One way to understand surveillance in its governance role is to unbundle the
assumptions, objectives, and actions inherent in the term. One useful framework
might be to divide surveillance into four principal components, which together
comprise what is commonly understood by the term: (1) normative, (2) informat-
ics, (3) control, and (4) governance. I will discuss each in turn. I will then suggest
the ways in which changes in the application or construction of each has both
substantive and implementary effect. Furthermore, I will propose ways in which
surveillance, now conceived as an aggregate of its components, has regulatory ef-
fect. The specific nature of those regulatory effects will also be explored. This
article ends with an application of the model in a public and a private context.
54. Torin Monahan, Questioning Surveillance and Security, in SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY:
TECHNOLOGICAL POLITICS AND POWER IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1, 10 (Torin Monahan ed., 2006).
55. See Larry Cati Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate
Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327 (2004).
56. See Wendy Nelson Espel & Michael Sauder, Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures
Recreate Social Worlds, 113 AM. J. OF SOC. 1, 35 (2007) ("Reflexivity makes the sharp distinction
between the act and object of measurement hard to sustain. Because we continually interpret our
social worlds, objects are unstable; they emerge and are reconstructed through measurement.").
57. For an early study of the panoptic element in surveillance, see OSCAR GANDY, THE PANOPTIC
SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 15-52 (1993).
58. See Larry Cati Backer, The Mechanics of Perfection: Philosophy, Theology and the Perfection of
American Law, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW (F.J. Mootz ed., forthcoming 2009) ("Self-
constituted communities are bounded by the 'truth'of their constitution.... Political communities,
like religious and social communities, are bounded by the 'truth' of their constitution-rationally
bounded by rules and understandings within which the infinite is possible.").
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II. NORMATIVE CONTEXT: THE FOUNDATIONS OF SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance, in its normative context, provides the boundaries within which
surveillance is comprehended. Normativity, here, suggests both passive and active
elements. Norms act on surveillance in its construction as technique. Surveillance is
the application of norms both in the construction of the gaze (how are objects ob-
served/recorded) and in the focus of the observation (what is observed/recorded). It
is at this level that modern surveillance and the social order in which it is embedded
most intimately interact.
The normative aspect of surveillance, thus, can be understood as the product
of two definitional categories: substantive and implementation surveillance nor-
mativity. Substantive surveillance normativity suggests overarching behavioral
constraints. The sources, character, and limitations of these constraints are well-
known. They comprise the morals and ethics of religious, cultural, ethnic, politi-
cal, and economic systems. And they are sometimes recognized by and normalized
within legal systems at the local, municipal, or international levels. Implementa-
tion surveillance normativity suggests the normative assumptions shaping ap-
proaches to the act of surveillance itself. The focus in this respect is on the nature,
character, and scope of appropriate surveillance, and the relationship of the com-
munity to monitoring actually undertaken. The normative aspect of implementa-
tion is well understood-in the United States it is permissible to seek information
about marriage but normatively unacceptable to acquire that information by post-
ing agents of the state in the bedrooms of married couples.
A. Substantive Surveillance Normativity
Many behavioral rules and outlooks converge at a high level of generality but
tend to diverge in their details. Both German and U.S. political systems value
human dignity. But the meanings of human dignity, as a theoretical construct
and as applied, vary widely between the United States and Germany. In the Ger-
man system, human dignity is a concept that forms the foundation of the black
letter of the Basic Law. 9 In the United States, that notion has been teased out of
the federal constitution in a more contextual stream of analysis-for example,
59. Grundgesetz far die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG][Basic Law] art. 1.
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touching on criminal punishment 60 or abortion.6' As a result, social tolerance of
surveillance, in both form and use, will differ from society to society and even
vary among ostensibly similar societies.62
Surveillance systems that ignore or violate substantive norms lose either le-
gitimacy or authority. Such violations expose the system as alien and unnatural,
subjecting the system, its operator, and the agents of surveillance, to discipline in
accordance with the rules of the normative community whose behavior codes
have been violated. Thus, for example, the series of attempts to construct univer-
sal monitoring systems as a response to the United States' "War on Terror" pro-
duced strong adverse popular reaction in the U.S. to some of those efforts and
resulted in the formal withdrawal of the more controversial programs. 63 As well,
the recent attempt by the United Nations to construct systems of global ordering
of multinational regulation based in substantial part on -transparency" and re-
porting regimes grounded in international human rights norms, was abandoned
in the face of substantial opposition from large institutional (state and corporate)
actors.64 Yet, those very systems of transparency-directed toward investor and
public regulatory communities and their interests-have become an accepted
normative framework for multinational regulation through "voluntary" codes of
corporate social responsibility.
6
While such behavioral frameworks are often universalizing in approach, all
60. Recent 8th Amendment cases have stressed the human dignity component of the analysis.
"In Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has repeatedly proclaimed that human dignity underlies
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment." Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in
Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 773 (2006) (citing Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
61. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1992) ("Personal decisions,
such as abortion, are vital to 'personal dignity and autonomy' and thus are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
62. Identity cards, for example, are less tolerated in the United States than in Germany. See DONALD
KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1997).
63. For example, early in the war against Iraq, the Bush administration permitted Admiral
Poindexter to suggest a number of vast data gathering efforts, the most notorious of which was the
"Total Information Awareness" program. This program, along with a number of others are use-
fully discussed in Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1146 (2006).
64. See Backer, Multinational Corporations, supra note 29, at 287.
65. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. DEVELOPMENT & COOPERATION DEV., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2002), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (recom-
mendations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises in a number of governance areas
including employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment, information disclosure,
combating bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, competition, and taxation).
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tend to be most important within the communities from which they arise. And
all tend to be subject to patterns of interpretive engagement in accordance with
the values and rules of the communities in which they are effective. Surveillance
substantive normativity, at its most effective, must reflect the overarching behav-
ioral constraints of both the communities within which surveillance arises and
within which surveillance is targeted. Where the normative constraints differ,
surveillance must be adjusted to fit within the common restraints and beliefs of
both. Thus, the greater the number of communities affected by systems of sur-
veillance, the greater the number of likely normative constraints for uniformly
applied systems. Alternatively, surveillance must be divided and adjusted to suit
the constraints of each. But this raises the costs of surveillance and might increase
the variability of information gathered or its utility.
But substantive surveillance normativity also suggests the possibility that sur-
veillance, and especially its technologies, themselves can affect norms.6 6 This is
especially the case, for example, with respect to social issues and public percep-
tions of the realities of social ills. Take, for example, the phenomenon of sexual
predators. "Although many people believe that the frequency of sex offending is
increasing, there is little convincing evidence that this is, in fact, the case .... In
the 1990s, in an era dominated by technologies of control and risk assessment,
many people have called for greater surveillance of these offenders, including
electronic monitoring and other such devices."' But surveillance systems and the
information that it produced may well have facilitated a change in attitudes which
in turn made it easier to impose substantially harsher restrictions on the living ar-
rangements of convicted sexual offenders. 61
More recently explored is the way in which surveillance systems tied to the
development of measures to judge the relative quality of U.S. legal education (and
66. This insight is not limited to surveillance. Thus, for example, administrators in Meiji, Japan
are said to have understood that "[s]ocial institutions such as technology embody their own world-
views, and once you have adopted a technology, it has an impact on your values. Having accepted
the inference that Western technology would bring Western values in its train, some of the more
radical Japanese reformers argued for a complete Westernization of Japan in order to save the
country." JOHN H. BERTHRONG, TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE CONFUCIAN WAY 176 (1998).
67. MIKE HOUGH ET AL., PENAL POPULISM AND PUBLIC OPINION: LESSONS FROM FIVE COUNTRIES
129 (2003) ("The latest proposal is to employ the Global Positioning System (GPS) to monitor the
location of offenders with convictions for crimes of sexual aggression involving children, and is being
used in some jurisdictions in the United States and is being considered in the United Kingdom.").
68. See Caleb Durling, Never Going Home: Does It Make Us Safer? Does It Make Sense? Sex Of-
fenders, Residency Restrictions, and Reforming Risk Management Law, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 317 (2006).
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law faculties) have tended to act on those institutions and faculties. 69 The mea-
sures themselves were originally (perhaps) derived from normative assumptions
outside the system of monitoring or information harvesting itself.7" These quality
measures then took on a life of their own.7 "Rankings have clearly changed how
legal educators make decisions about how resources are allocated.' 72
B. Implementation Surveillance Normativity
If substantive surveillance normativity suggests conformity of technique with
the norm systems of the community in which it is deployed, implementation surveil-
lance normativity suggests the normative assumptions shaping approaches to surveil-
lance itself. It embraces not merely behavioral constraints generally understood, but
also behavioral assumptions relating to the shape and content of surveillance itself. In
addition, surveillance normativity shapes the assumptions about appropriate re-
sponses to surveillance by the population monitored as well as by the monitors.
Thus, the focus in this respect is on the nature, character, and scope of appro-
priate surveillance and the relationship of the community to monitoring. This
implicates what in American jurisprudence is known as "privacy," "whistle blow-
69. See generally Espeland & Sauder, supra note 56, at 1-40.
70. For an interesting discussion in an "as applied" context, see the methodological analysis put
forward by Brian Leiter, a legal academic who has made a name for himself as a harvester of facts
and manager of knowledge, molded into judgments about both the "rankings" of law schools and
the characteristics of law faculty that underlie such judgments. Leiter uses a number of informa-
tion clusters to elaborate his judgments. See generally Brian Leiter, Brian Leiter's Law School Rank-
ings, http://www.leiterrankings.com/new/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 7, 2007). The search is
always for "facts," objective measures. But facts and objective measures invariably descend into the
symbolic, or the proxy measure. For example, in the search for a listing of rank based on scholarly
impact, Leiter chose as an objective measure citations to work in a particular database owned by
Westlaw, an online law source. See Brian Leiter, Top 35 Law Faculties Based on Scholarly Impact
(Sept. 1, 2007), available at http://www.leiterrankings.com/faculty/2007faculty-impact.shtml. But
citation rates are not a measure of scholarly reputation, the reader is almost immediately informed.
It is, instead, its proxy. Id. Although "we might identify six kinds of phenomena at work here
which skew the correlation between citation and quality," the result is still useful. Id. The reason
is simple: "an imperfect measure may still be an adequate measure, and that is almost certainly
true of citation rates as a proxy for impact as a proxy for reputation or quality." Id. Even were this
not true at the beginning, as people conform their behavior to the measure, and their understand-
ing of quality to this system, then the measure itself becomes the thing (quality) itself.
71. See, e.g., Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S. News
and World Report Rankings on the Admission Process of Law Schools, 40 L. & Soc. REv. 105 (2006).
72. Espeland & Sauder,supra note 56, at 27.
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ing," and "corruption."" The focus is also on the extent of an obligation to be open
(transparency) or to affirmatively seek information (monitor) as inherent in the
assumptions about the relationship of institutions to their stakeholders (from
shareholders, employees, directors, and investors to customers and others).74
Two movements are worth noting in the construction of the boundaries of sur-
veillance normativity, each of which has significantly altered the framework within
which surveillance normativity is understood. The first involves the relationship be-
tween surveillance normativity and the organizations/communities/institutions
that are the loci of surveillance. That relationship, in the United States, has changed
substantially from one based on passivity-that is on the obligation to monitor only
after provocation-to one based on an active principle-that surveillance is an es-
sential component of any normative system. Surveillance normativity is grounded
in the belief that law is not self-enforcing. Those subject to the obligations of law
must be made to obey positive commands, and prevented from shirking their duty
to comply with negative obligations (the obligations to refrain from doing). Those
subject to such obligations are no longer presumed to do so unless evidence to the
contrary is produced. And that compulsion no longer comes at the point of a gun or
in the uttering of individual representations of the legitimate authority of the state.
Instead, it comes through the gaze; systems of constant observation combined with
a self-awareness of being constantly observed that together coerces a particular set of
behaviors tied to the character of the observation. Thus, for example, fake Closed
Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras around a building may be as effective a deter-
rent as real CCTV cameras and produce the same behavioral response.
Compliance, then, is a function of both observation and the knowledge of
being observed. In some important respects, law is a function of surveillance, that
is, the focus of law is on the organization of surveillance, and its application. Law
in this sense can be understood as a framework for surveillance, understanding
surveillance as information gathering, assessment, and judgment. In the field of
corporate regulation in the United States, this foundational normative turn is
73. See, e.g., TERANCE D. MIETHE, WHISTLEBLOWING AT WORK: TOUGH CHOICES IN EXPOSING
FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE ON THE JOB 36 (1999) ("As a method for detecting and exposing miscon-
duct in the workplace, whistleblowing has no rivals. Alternative methods are simply incapable of
achieving the continuous monitoring and insights into organizational practices that are provided
by employees themselves. In contrast to other methods of control, whistleblowers provide surveil-
lance and monitoring in all organizations and are better situated in the organizational hierarchy
to ask questions to build a solid case against offenders.").
74. Current American securities regulation is grounded in this notion. See JAMES BURK, VALUES IN
THE MARKETPLACE: THE AMERICAN STOCK MARKET UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 25-28 (1992).
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nicely exemplified by the move from Graham v. Allis Chalmers" to In re Caremark"
as the basis for the legal regulation of surveillance under Delaware corporate law.77
In the field of American federal criminal law, it is marked by the progressively
more intrusive calculus of federal Attorney General guidelines on prosecution of
corporations."s This reflex also has a transnational dimension. The OECD's Anti-
75. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) ("Absent cause for suspi-
cion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to
ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.").
76. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 ("Only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exer-
cise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting
system exists-will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability."); In re
Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (affirming and expanding In re Caremark).
77. See Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the Directorial Duty
of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 389, 403-20 (2002) (arguing that Texaco's
corporate response to race-discrimination allegations were in breach of the fiduciary duty of care
owed to Texaco's directorate and management). The Delaware Supreme Court has most recently
articulated the standard as follows:
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director oversight
liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or
controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor
or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems
requiring their attention. In either case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the
directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations. Where directors
fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for
their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary
obligation in good faith.
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
78. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General (Jan. 20, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business-organizations.pdf (The Thompson Memo). The Thomp-
son Memo sets out factors to be evaluated in any Department of Justice determination to prosecute a
corporation. Among the most relevant for my purposes here is an evaluation of "compliance pro-
grams." The memo explains:
Compliance programs are established by corporate management to prevent and to detect mis-
conduct and to ensure that corporate activities are conducted in accordance with all applicable
criminal and civil laws, regulations, and rules. The Department encourages such corporate self-
policing, including voluntary disclosures to the government of any problems that a corporation
discovers on its own. However, the existence of a compliance program is not sufficient, in and of
itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal conduct undertaken by its officers, di-
rectors, employees, or agents. Indeed, the commission of such crimes in the face of a compliance
program may suggest that the corporate management is not adequately enforcing its program.
Id. at 8. The aggressiveness of the government's position in the Thompson Memo has produced a
certain negative reaction in the United States federal courts. See, e.g., U.S. v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d
330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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Bribery Convention" is perhaps a case in point. In that context, compliance mon-
itoring serves to discipline conduct and refine the normative context in which
monitoring occurs."0
The second movement involves the relationship between implementation
surveillance normativity and individuals. It is perhaps best understood in the con-
text of the rise of a social "duty of loyalty"'" at every level of the social order (acting
for the benefit of the organization rather than for personal benefit) and the conse-
quential focus on "corruption." In the public lending arena this is marked by a
move to impose systems of surveillance for government officials. The World
Bank's well-publicized programs provide a useful case in point. 2 Efforts at self-
79. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (1998), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf. Article 12 of the Convention provides:
Article 12 - Monitoring and Follow-up: The Parties shall co-operate in carrying out a pro-
gramme of systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full implementation of this Con-
vention. Unless otherwise decided by consensus of the Parties, this shall be done in the
framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions
and according to its terms of reference, or within the framework and terms of reference of any
successor to its functions, and Parties shall bear the costs of the programme in accordance with
the rules applicable to that body.
Id. at 8.
80. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD FIGHTS CORRUPTION (2006),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/51/37418910.pdf. The brochure states:
Countries' enforcement of these measures is systematically monitored to ensure that these
instruments are being implemented effectively. This international, mutual evaluation and the
peer pressure it has generated over the last decade have stimulated and guided governments
to take concrete action to promote integrity in the corporate sector, prevent corruption, and
investigate and prosecute cases of foreign bribery.
Id. at 8. This culture of transparency is reinforced through a series of public mechanisms, includ-
ing the production of annual reports on compliance that tend to reinforce the norms privileged in
the reports. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY,
ANNUAL REPORT 2006 9-14 (2008), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/29/38865251.pdf.
81. This represents, in effect, a global expansion of the presumptions inherent in the German
constitutional notion of Bundestreue. Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political
Morality of Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731 (2004). In the German constitutional context it sug-
gests a limitation of authority and action-one must act in fidelity to the federal system of which
one is a member, "the constitutional duty that the components of the Federation maintain fidelity
to one another as well as to the larger whole, that the Federation maintain fidelity to the compo-
nent parts, and that they all reach mutual understanding." Id., at 757 (citing BVerfGE 1 (1952), 299
(315)). In the context of surveillance norms, it suggests that one must do the same within the insti-
tutionalized community in which one is operating-be it company, church, association or state.
82. On the World Bank's anti-corruption programs and its relationship to surveillance, see
WORLD BANK, ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOLKIT 6, 214-19 (2001), http://www.worldbank.org/public
sector/legal/aclawissues.pdf.
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regulation and structured public/private partnerships thus seek to naturalize a
norm set in which surveillance serves as the expression of normative frameworks
for behavior in economic enterprises.
83
The transnational and cultural elements of surveillance are apparent. "At its
broadest, information serves in the development and influence on (in totalitarian
regimes control of) political, social, economic, and other aspects of culture (that is
information gathering has normative consequences well exploited by the state)." 4
At the same time, "states have sought to privatize information gathering for its own
use in the disciplining of social organization."" Simultaneously, private institutions
seek to reproduce the systems of surveillance either for their own benefit or because
they have been compelled to do so for the benefit of a superior institution (usually
the state). The distance between public and private becomes more narrow. The
characteristics that distinguish the operation of one from the other become less clear.
The ability to discern the different fields in which each operates and the different
constituencies each serves, becomes harder to identify. What was once relatively un-
connected becomes connected through the medium of surveillance. The rule be-
comes the observable for states as well as for other communities.
III. SURVEILLANCE AS INFORMATICS:
BUILDING BLOCKS OF POWER/KNOWLEDGE
It is in its aspect as the cluster of behaviors we commonly refer to as "infor-
matics" that most people understand surveillance. Surveillance as information
suggests a neutral, mechanical, and systems approach to material that already ex-
ists. It also suggests a managerial relationship between information and its sub-
ject. Surveillance in this sense serves as both the resource and the mechanics of its
83. In the case of World Bank anti-corruption efforts the techniques of surveillance were devel-
oped through the Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP):
which was publicly launched on August 1, 2006. Under the VDP, participants commit to: (1) not
engage in misconduct in the future; (2) disclose to the Bank the results of an internal investiga-
tion into past bad acts in Bank-financed or supported projects or contracts; and (3) implement a
robust internal compliance program monitored by a Bank-approved compliance monitor. Par-
ticipants pay the costs associated with almost every step of the VDP process. In exchange for full
cooperation, VDP participants avoid debarment for disclosed past misconduct, their identities
are kept confidential, and they may continue to compete for Bank-supported projects.
Margaret Ayres et al., Developments in U.S. and International Efforts to Prevent Corruption, 41 INT'L
LAW. 597, 609 (2007) (citations omitted).
84. Backer, supra note 50.
85. Id.
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harvesting. Surveillance, in this aspect, is farming. It accords nicely with the man-
agerialism that has characterized the movement toward bureaucratized gover-
nance apparent since the time of Max Weber, in its most sinister aspects. 6
Informatics involves three distinct sets of actions: data identification (raw in-
formation), the practice of data collection (structure and properties of informa-
tion gathering-knowledge production), and data uses (drawing conclusions
from information-judgment function). These three foundational forms of ac-
tion both define the boundaries of surveillance informatics and suggest its prin-
ciple variables. These variables consist of (1) data itself (raw information); (2)
systems of processing data collections into information useful to someone; (3) sys-
tems of evaluating information; and (4) systems of disseminating or communicat-
ing information after evaluation. Thus, as informatics, surveillance presents a
host of variables grounded in data, on the one hand, and systems, on the other.
But surveillance informatics is not concerned with issues either of the identity or
character of the recipient of information (issues of to whom is information deliv-
ered beyond the person or entity producing the information) or the identity or
character of the person or entity that may make use of the information.
A. Data Identification
Data identification is, on the surface, the easiest marker of surveillance. This
is data management at its most raw. It seems simple enough. Data are facts, occur-
rences, events, or something else that can be recorded, observed, experienced,
stored, and retrieved. Yet, data identification is conceptually pregnant with nor-
mative and governance significance. The identification itself suggests normative
assessment. And the choice of one set of information or data, over others, also sug-
gests normative value. 7 Consider something straightforward, like the decennial
census required under the United States Constitution.8 It is possible that the
86. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1978). See also Martin Schulz, Limits To Bureau-
cratic Growth: The Density Dependence Of Organizational Rule Births, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 845, 845
(1998) ("Bureaucratization is regarded as a rule generation process turned loose. Bureaucracy
theorists-as well as much of the general public, including government officials who promise to
reinvent government-assume that bureaucracies frantically breed rules, and frequently they
imply that rule breeding intensifies as bureaucratization proceeds.").
87. The politics of HIV data collection provides an interesting example, both in its national and
transnational aspects. See, e.g., NETWORK EPIDEMIOLOGY: A HANDBOOK FOR SURVEY DESIGN AND
DATA COLLECTION (Martina Morris ed., 2004).
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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count must include lawful permanent residents as well as citizens, or perhaps it
ought to include all residents, irrespective of their status. The data, themselves,
are a function of a political determination. 9
Data issues center on recognition. The principle variable involves the constitu-
tion of data. The foundational issues of data revolve around the questions: What is
raw information? What is judgment or conclusion? An easy example of this prob-
lem is "race": is it raw data or is it a judgment?9" The answer may depend on factors
outside of, but informing, the constitution of the data themselves." The same ap-
plies to other data markers-for example, what constitutes corruption ?92 What con-
stitutes sexual deviance? 3 Recognition issues can be manifested in several ways.
89. See, e.g., Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Data and Dogma in Public Policy, 94 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N
359, 360 (1999) ("Other areas of data collection unavoidably involve political outcomes such that
there are unavoidable political inputs .... Recall that we never did reapportion the House in the
1920s, following the dread discovery that the nation was no longer predominantly rural. An inge-
nious member from Kansas proposed that we not count persons not naturalized, and presumably
huddled in cities.").
90. See, e.g., Katherine K. Wallman, Data on Race and Ethnicity: Revising the Federal Standard,
52 AM. STATISTICIAN 31 (1998).
91. Thus, for example, if it is believed that "race" is constructed, then it doesn't exist as a fact.
See, e.g., Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fab-
rication, and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 1, 6 (1994). And data on race actually monitor the
aggregate assumptions of those who use a variety of (false) classifications to sort people. The data
are actually a proxy for the judgment.
92. WORLD BANK, NEW EMPIRICAL TOOLS FOR ANTI CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM,
HELPING COUNTRIES BUILD AND IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES (2007),
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/205638/00%2dintro.pdf; WORLD BANK INSTITUTE,
GOVERNANCE: A PARTICIPATORY, ACTION-ORIENTED PROGRAM, PROGRAM BRIEF DOCUMENT 42
(2001), http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/fy02.brief.pdf (describing among the
various programs, a module on "governance data capacity building and monitoring initiative").
The World Bank Institute program:
[R]esponds to the demand for action on governance in developing countries.... The assess-
ment will form the basis for a medium- to long-term strategy for building capacity in gover-
nance diagnostics and monitoring. The initiative aims to assist developing countries by
strengthening their statistical, survey data and analytical capacity, by increasing transparency
and access to information using also IT technologies, and by improving the quality of infor-
mation on governance issues for both Government and civil society generally.
WORLD BANK INSTITUTE, GOVERNANCE: A PARTICIPATORY, ACTION-ORIENTED PROGRAM, PROGRAM
BRIEF DOCUMENT 42 (2001), http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/fy02-brief.pdf.
93. There is a mountain of literature on this subject, sensitive to both the medical and political
ramifications of definition, surveillance, and management. See, e.g., Dana Seitler, Queer Physiogno-
mies; or, How Many Ways Can We Do the History of Sexuality?, 46 CRITICISM 71, 74 (2004) (discuss-
ing "pathologizing medical discourses of surveillance and punishment of what would come to be
known as 'homosexuality' in the twentieth century.").
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First, related to the problem of the constitution of data (as fact or judgment)
is the problem of shifting understanding of the characteristics of facts constituting
the data. Science provides a useful example. In collecting data on planets-are
data on Pluto to be collected? The answer used to be yes; the current answer is a
qualified no."4 The celestial body has not changed characteristics, but its quality as
data has changed.
Another problem is data source. Where the data source has an interest in the
construction and production of data, the data themselves might be corrupted. An
example is data collected on factors indicating the success of the Cuban Revolu-
tion by the Cuban revolutionary government.95 The constitution of data thus is
directly influenced by the normative framework within which data are them-
selves constructed. Even the most basic data can be contested to some extent or
reflect the contextual basis in which they are "seen" or understood to constitute
"raw data."
B. Data Collection
The construction of systems for data collection, like data identification, is
more complicated than the simple implementation of methods of collection.
Structuring information gathering, and the properties of that structuring, impli-
cates the production of knowledge. But the production of knowledge is itself em-
bedded within the cultural matrix in which it operates, even as it contributes to
the production and maintenance of that matrix. 96 Surveillance works to provide
the "data" serving as a basis of socially constructed belief, and on that basis on the
confirmation of the belief, which is a function of the construction itself.97
Collection issues problematize "data" and their identification as such. These
94. See Mason Inman, Pluto Not a Planet, Astronomers Rule, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Aug. 24,
2006) available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060824-pluto-planet.html.
95. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernandez Truyol, Out in Left Field: Cuba's Post Cold War Strike-
out, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 15, 18 (1994) ("To maintain the author's commitment to fair, even-
handed analysis and lack of predispositions in evaluating the present situation in Cuba, reliance is
placed whenever possible on what can be deemed 'neutral,' i.e., non-ideologically-based data that
is gathered by and available from the United Nations.").
96. The sociology of the production of institutionalized legal knowledge is usefully explored in
Bourdieu. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 805 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).
97. See Richard Terdiman, Translator's Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: To-
ward a Sociology of the Juridicial Field (Richard Terdiman trans.), 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 806 (1987)
(on an explanation of Bourdieu's terminology).
GLOBAL PANOPTICISM
issues implicate the production of knowledge from data collected. Here the prin-
cipal focus is on capacity and parameter issues. These include:
(1) Scope: what sort of data are to be collected;98
(2) Focus of the gaze (within scope of collection): what sort of data collected
are to be emphasized and what data are to be discarded or ignored; 99
(3) Capacity for collection: this is an issue of technological capacity-how
can data be harvested; how much can be harvested; what are the limits of data
harvesting; 00 and
(4) Analytical framework: how data are to be interpreted or put together,
and how data are to be framed given the objectives underlying their collection. 1'
98. An excellent recent example of this issue arises in the context of the regulation of corporate
activity. Under traditional surveillance regimes, economic entities are usually required to report only
financial data. But that privileges a view of corporate activity centering on its economic performance
as measured by the data to be supplied. Where additional data are collected-for example on entities'
social and environmental activities, the focus of both reporting and corporate conduct may be af-
fected. See Larry CatA Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Mar-
kets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEo. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2008).
99. The recent controversy over the extent of reporting of executive compensation is a case in
point. Though corporations report financial data, that reporting may focus on some areas and ig-
nore or hide others. That produces incentives and opportunities to engage in strategically advanta-
geous behavior. See, e.g., Roel C. Campos, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks Before the 2007 Summit
on Executive Compensation (Jan. 23, 2007) (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/
spch0l2307rcc.htm) ("I'm sure that some are hopeful that the new disclosure rules will have the
effect of lowering CEO compensation, and that might be the case, but I'm not sure. Laws and rules
have curious unintended consequences." Id.).
100. Surveillance is keenly dependent on technology in both qualitative and quantitative terms.
But it goes farther than that. Technology also affects the ease with which harvested information
may be utilized. The recent efforts to keep track of computer communications provides a telling
case in point. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. North, Carnivore in Cyberspace: Extending the Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act's Framework to Carnivore Surveillance, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
155 (2002). See generally The Carnivore Controversy: Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in the
Digital Age: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000).
101. The reasons for collecting data, of course, significantly affect the character of the information
collected, processed and used. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972) ("Moreover, we do not hold that the same type of standards and procedures prescribed by
Title III are necessarily applicable to this case. We recognize that domestic security surveillance may
involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of'ordinary crime.'... Given
these potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances and those involving the domes-
tic security, Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from
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Each of these factors affects the character of the information to be produced,
the aggregate shape of the data collected, and the likely shape of the "outcomes" of
harvesting for whatever judgment is to be made or whatever sets of behaviors are
to be applauded or condemned. The determination of scope, focus (inclusion and
exclusion), capacity, and framework, affects the way in which the monitor and
monitored approach a valuation of appropriate behavior.
C. From Data to Information Evaluation
Related to recognition and collection issues are use issues relating to data (judg-
ment). Identification and production serve as the foundation for utility, for the use
of knowledge. This is the power of power/knowledge 2 Data are inert until used.103
Though the identification and harvesting of knowledge implicates judgment (and
use), that use remains contingent until the active element is introduced. That active
element blends time and agency. Data can sit for long or short periods of time-
subject to the technologies of preservation and retrieval. Information use is contex-
tual-who uses it in what cultural context colors the importance and character of
the information at the moment of its deployment. That use is not merely consequen-
tial-it serves as the essence of the governance element of surveillance. This charac-
teristic of making judgments and deploying those judgments within the community
under observation can be understood as governance.' 4
those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III." Id. at 322). Though teased out in the lan-
guage of law, these are the issues at the heart of the surveillance debates in the wake of the terrorist
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Punish or Surveil,
16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 873 (2007); Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of
National Security Litigation, 75 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 1249 (2007). See generally Adam D. Moore, To-
ward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 809, 838-39 (2007).
102. The information management field is well aware of this insight that has yet to penetrate law to
any useful extent. "In the past, systems for business have focused on selected data within a certain
context to produce information. A better approach is to take information accompanied by experience
over time to generate important knowledge. In addition, knowledge that is renewed and enhanced
can be a creative source to outmaneuver competition." ROBERT J. THIERAUF, KNOWLEDGE MANAGE-
MENT SYSTEMS FOR BuSINESS vii (1999). The author, for example, constructs a hierarchy of knowledge
that effectively applies the knowledge/power dynamic. Data are identified as "[u]nstructured facts,"
information as "[sitructured data useful for analysis," knowledge is described as "[o]btained from
experts based on actual experience," wisdom is defined an "[a]bility to judge soundly," and truth is
understood as "[c]onformance to fact or reality." Id. at 6.
103. But recall that data themselves can also constitute a product of judgment, that is, data them-
selves itself represent a judgment about what constitutes a "fact" or discrete data. See discussion
supra Part III. A.
104. See discussion infra Part IV. D.
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Use issues revolve around the problem of the conversion of data into informa-
tion. This suggests that there is a two-way relationship between data-its aggre-
gate construction and the purposes/principles to be furthered by the surveillance
exercise. Use problems are grounded in issues of sufficiency, each of which affects
capacity in different ways. These include:
(1) Verification: confirmation, corroboration, and confirmation of a condi-
tion, effort, or authenticity of assertions. Verification, for example, was a primary
use objective of information gathering in Iraq before the U.S. invasion in 2003.05
(2) Management: assessment or basis for making decisions touching on the
organization, staffing, and internal operation of the entity. Information gathering
for use in employee evaluation, for example, or for the evaluation of any product,
system or condition touches on the evaluative function of information. 6
(3) Exposure: disclosure, transmission, dissemination, or privileging of par-
ticular facts going to issues of fundamental importance to the operation or manage-
ment of the entity. Exposure of wrongdoing may provide the basic objective of
information and its use-for example littering, drug use in parks, or sex in public
bathrooms. 17 Compliance with obligations has been an increasingly useful objective
of information gathering on the behavior of multinational corporations by non-gov-
ernmental organizations and other informal monitors of enterprise activity.' 8
(4) Confession: affirmation, acknowledgement of a judgment, condition, or
action. The monitoring aspects of American securities law, for example, are rid-
dled with the technique of confession.0 9
105. See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. BAILEY, THE UN INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ: LESSONS FOR ON-SITE VERIFI-
CATION (1995).
106. See, e.g., Kristie Ball, Categorizing the Workers, Electronic Surveillance and Social Ordering in
the Call Center, in SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION
201 (David Lyon ed., 2002).
107. See, e.g., DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE Us TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998).
108. See Larry CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of Transnational
Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INT'L COMP. L. (forthcoming 2007-2008).
109. Certifications, affirmations, and other swearing mark the principal documents used to reg-
ister securities, to periodically report on the financial status of the registrant, and especially under
the provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, to attest to the financial condition of the company and
critically, under Section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, to attest to the functioning of the internal
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Lastly, data harvesting implicates surveillance system issues. There is an ob-
jective element-touching on the sufficiency of data generated-and there is a
relational element-focusing on the relationship of information put together from
data generated related to the judgment to be made. It also looks to the connection
to principles/purposes to be furthered. In this aspect, data harvesting intersects
with issues of surveillance normativity. This is especially the case where issues of
legitimacy of methodology arise.'
D. Dissemination of Information
Information utility requires a system for the useful harvesting of data. That
requires turning data into information suitable for a particular purpose. But sur-
veillance has an active as well as a passive element. That active element requires
broadcasting of information to an appropriate range of recipients. Information is
power not merely for the persons collecting data, or for those charged with its
evaluation, but also for those who receive data or its products and can act on the
basis of the information received. Information is, in this sense, a commodity with
a certain value. That value may depend on its scarcity.
The information hierarchies and power relationships implicit in the system of
secret information nicely illustrates the relationship between information and its
dissemination."' It also suggests the multiple layers of surveillance informatics de-
scribed in this part. Data, information, and the power to evaluate information are
objects of power. To be eligible for top secret clearance requires conformity to a set
of exacting norms and behaviors, the reward for which is access to information
that is itself a gateway to governance power. There is a positive correlation be-
tween status, power, and access to information.
The converse is true as well. Transparency has been an effective tool for de-
mocratization as well as for broadening the class of persons who might be able to
system of surveillance from which data is drawn for both private purposes (participation by private
stakeholders) and public purposes (regulatory control by the state). See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, supra note 8; Larry Catd Backer, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Federalizing Norms for Officers,
Lawyer and Accountant Behavior, 76 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 897 (2002).
110. See discussion supra Part II.A.
111. See Further Amendment to Executive Order 12958, As Amended, Classified National Se-
curity Information, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030325-l1
.html (prescribing "a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national se-
curity information"). The system is based on an acceptance of the idea that "[p]rotecting informa-
tion critical to our Nation's security remains a priority." Id.
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act on information. The efforts of non-governmental organizations- monitoring
the behavior of multinational corporations and producing reports of their moni-
toring activities that are published in the media-have been a powerful method
of regulating the behavior of multinational enterprises without recourse to law."2
IV. SURVEILLANCE AS CONTROL
The control aspect of surveillance is tied to the judgment aspect of knowl-
edge production, but it also tends to change the understanding of knowledge.
More importantly, it changes the dynamics of the harvesting of information for its
use in producing judgment and control."3 There is little in the private/public di-
vide suggested by legal systems in the intervention of surveillance in the produc-
tion and construction of knowledge. 14 Thus, monitoring regimes in the policing
of securities markets have acquired a cross-border dimension as well as a fractur-
ing of surveillance power between public and private entities." ' In another con-
text, the
112. Consider for example the work of the non-governmental organization, Transparency Inter-
national, "a global network including more than 90 locally established national chapters and chap-
ters-in-formation .... Politically non-partisan, TI does not undertake investigations of alleged
corruption or expose individual cases, but at times will work in coalition with organisations that
do." Transparency International, About Us, http://www.transparency.org/about-us. Transparency
International is known for a number of indexes it publishes based on information it receives and
processes on various aspects of corruption. These include the "TI Corruption Perceptions Index
(CPI), first released in 1995, [and] the best known of TI's tools. It has been widely credited for put-
ting TI and the issue of corruption on the international policy agenda. The CPI ranks more than
150 countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and
opinion surveys." Transparency International, Tools, Measurement, http://www.transparency.orgl
tools/measurement. They also publish a Bribe Payors' Index. Id.
113. See WILLIAM I. MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1998).
114. See generally Louis W. PAULY, WHO ELECTED THE BANKERS? SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL IN
THE WORLD ECONOMY (1997).
115. See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Gov-
ernance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROiS. 263,280 (2005).
Hybrid public-private administration is widespread in mutual recognition regimes, which
can involve the outsourcing of monitoring, certification, and assessment functions. For ex-
ample, in the U.S.-E.U. 'safe harbour' negotiations over the recognition of privacy standards,
the E.U. member states' data privacy authorities met with BBB OnLine, a private U.S. entity,
to see how its certification works within the U.S. context. When European authorities be-
came more comfortable with U.S. oversight mechanisms that involve private entities backed
by potential enforcement by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, they agreed to the transat-
lantic Safe Harbor understanding.
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media are an industry with political implications, as well as repro-
ducing culture, selectively representing the world, and selling goods
and services. The media act in subtle, indirect, and direct ways as
conduits of social control, surveillance, monitoring, and classifica-
tion. They are a fundamental mechanism in active social control,
i.e., the selective enforcement of norms through sanctioning in a
network of communicants. 6
These ideas are bound up in the concept of synecdoche." 7 Grounding action
through surveillance in the notion that the part (observed) can represent the whole
(whether or not observed) transforms the techniques of observation (data gather-
ing) into performative and symbolic roles. It transforms the observed into a repre-
sentation of the whole of the observable. And on that basis, it turns the observed
into the basis for judgment. Judgment in this sense, is understood in its regulatory
dimension. This is surveillance in its aspect as "power applied" to control. It in-
vokes a distribution element as well.
The control aspect of surveillance can be divided into four substantive elements:
(1) Who may determine what information must be produced and what judgment
may be made from the information thus produced; (2) Who must produce informa-
tion; (3) Who may make use of the information (who is the beneficiary of the infor-
mation-direct and indirect); and (4) How can it be used-the heart of the
regulatory aspect of this set of surveillance components. Each is discussed in turn.
A. The Power to Determine the Contours of Information Production
The question of control of information production and the normative basis of
judgment has not been sufficiently studied, but the outlines of the problems for
law and governance appear fairly clear. At the most parochial level, investing data
harvesting with significance increases the power of the information gatherer and
116. Peter K. Manning, Reflections: The Visual as a Mode of Social Control, in MAKING TROUBLE:
CULTURAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF CRIME, DEVIANCE, AND CONTROl 255,259 (Jeff Ferrell & Neil Webs-
dale eds., 1999) [hereinafter MAKING TROUBLE].
117. The origins of the term are in rhetoric. See GIAMBATTISTA VICo, THE ART OF RHETORIC 143
(INSTITUTIONES ORRATORIAE, 1711-1741) (Giorgio A. Pinton & Arthur Shippee eds. & trans., 1996).
For a useful discussion of the concept of synecdoche, see DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BA-
sics 132-34, 243-44 (2002).
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the institutions of data collection that the gatherer controls."' Control of the choice
of data to be collected is the foundational power of surveillance. This power tends
to affect not only the obligations of those under observation and the data gather-
ers, but also the parameters of conceptualization of the "issue" and its possible
solution. In a sense, the choice of data is the basic building block of surveillance as
a regulatory vehicle.
Consider an easy example-accounting principles. Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (GAAP)"9 and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
(GAAS)2 ° provide a universe of definitions of the meaning of economic activity
and the methods by which they may be conceived and reported, in line with a
meta-conceptual system centered on the meaningfulness of financial statements.
Control of GAAP has extraordinary effects on the way business is understood,
and therefore on the way business is organized, and to some extent, on the way in
which it may consider business decisions (at least with respect to their effects of
the corporation's financial statements). Control of GAAP, in the United States,
traditionally has been in the hands of the accounting profession.2 1 In the Euro-
pean Union, the state has traditionally controlled the meaningfulness of data.
Since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,' 2  the United States govern-
ment has sought to take an increasing amount of control over the meaningfulness
and judgment value of data from private self-regulatory groups. These shifts in
control can have significant effects on the reality of business as presented through
their financial statements. And control of that reality has normative political and
118. Consider Matthew M. Mason, Meeting the Challenges of Data Collection in Outcome Systems,
23 EDUCATION & TREATMENT OF CHILDREN 75, 79 (2000):
The measurement of outcomes has wider reaching effects on agencies than may first be antici-
pated. Initially, outcome measurement may be pegged as a quality control function, or be de-
scribed as a program improvement process.... Frequently, what was meant as an add-on activity
to one or two staff member's jobs grows to influence and involve numerous people, including
leadership, development, clinical, financial, recruiting, direct and indirect care personnel.
119. For a history of GAAP, see Financial Accounting Standards Board, http://72.3.243.42/
project/gaap-hierarchy.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
120. For a history of GAAS, see Robert Tie, The New World ofAuditing Standards:A Conversation
with the ASB, J. AccT., May 2006, at 59.
121. These include the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which has been desig-
nated, since the 1970s, by the SEC as the organization charged with setting accounting standards
for the public interest. See FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). The his-
tory of contests for power to control the meaning of accounting data is itself an excellent window
on the normative nature of surveillance. See ROBERT VAN RIPER, SETTING STANDARDS FOR FINAN-
CIAL REPORTING: FASB AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF A CRITICAL PROCEss (1994).
122. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200 2 , supra note 8.
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economic effects. Thus, for example, a high priority between the United States
and the European Union has centered on an attempt to bring control of GAAP
into government hands and to seek to harmonize the meaning of those terms for
the mutual benefits of both.'23 By controlling the content and methods of financial
disclosure, government would also seek to control those actions which are to be
encouraged and those which are not. In this way, the behavior of economic enti-
ties will be effectively controlled-by reference to the privileging and marginal-
ization of behaviors represented in the systems of accounting disclosure, without
the bother of controlling conduct through direct legislation. Control of the power
to determine these standards thus has significant political effect.
The question of the nature of the judgment that may be made from the infor-
mation thus produced is harder. This suggests a relationship between data and "pol-
icy." Data tends to be collected for a set of specific objectives in furtherance of a
particular cluster of policy. 24 The choice of data collected, and the meaning ex-
tracted from that data, is grounded in this synthesis of data, objectives, and policy.
123. This would include the work of the International Accounting Standards Board:
The International Accounting Standards Board is an independent, privately-funded ac-
counting standard-setter based in London, UK. The Board members come from nine coun-
tries and have a variety of functional backgrounds. The IASB is committed to developing, in
the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable and enforceable global ac-
counting standards that require transparent and comparable information in general purpose
financial statements. In addition, the IASB co-operates with national accounting standard-
setters to achieve convergence in accounting standards around the world.
International Accounting Standards Board, About IASB, http://iasb.org (follow "about us" hyper-
link, then follow "About IASB" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 14, 2008). See also Melvin Houston &
Alan Reinstein, International Accounting Standards and Their Implications for Accountants and U.S.
Financial Statement Users, REv. Bus., Summer 2001, at 75. But harmonization remains to be ful-
filled within the European Union itself. Accounting data is thus a particularly useful field in
which to understand the difference between data and meaning, between information and judg-
ment. See Susan M. Sorensen & Donald L. Kyle, Found in Translation: A Guide to Using Foreign
Financial Statements, 203 J. ACCT, Feb. 2007, at 38.
124. The information gathering apparatus and techniques of the "War on Terror" provide an
excellent example. Data is chosen, techniques developed, and the scope of the gathering efforts
determined in light of the objectives-not a scholarly determination of the character and nature of
terrorism, or of the assessment of information for the purpose of determining what constitutes
terror, but focused on a cluster of "enemies" already identified who engage in tactics and objectives
already understood. See Seth F. Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency and
Political Freedom in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 133, 149-69 (2004) ("A political estab-
lishment that systematically tracks the involvement of particular individuals in political support or
opposition is a political establishment that can move to reward supporters and punish critics," cit-
ing to that old adage from organizational theory, "you manage what you measure" in Louis Low-
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B. Assigning Responsibility for the Production of Information
Yet, the question of who must produce information is harder still. This impli-
cates both the objects of policy and the power to organize institutions for the
generation or harvesting of particular sets of data. In some respects the power to
subject a person or entity, event, or occurrence to observation is as important as
the power to choose among data to harvest. This is a power to impose a regulatory
regime beyond the traditional juridico-legal regimes of traditional society on
which state authority had been built.'25
C. Who May Make Use of Information
Defining the classes of actors who may make use of the information (who is
the beneficiary of the information-direct and indirect) presents additional dif-
ficult issues of law, policy, and governance. To a large extent, this is the question
usually framed in terms of the objectives of the observation and the class of per-
sons or things against which observation and reporting is necessary. Yet, this-im-
plicates power more than policy. The reference is not to the ordinary sort of power,
understood as the exercise of legitimate political power, but to power understood
as the holder of a control over data that is desired. That control can be held easily
by a private organization that has access to information.
2 6
D. How May Information be Used
Lastly, the objectives for which information harvested may be used present the
most difficult question. This last consideration forms the heart of the regulatory as-
pect of this set of surveillance components. The focus of the control issues in surveil-
lance is bound up with the institutionalized systems through which data is produced
and bundled as judgments-that is, as conclusions. It also is focused on the use of
data to verify, manage, expose, or induce confession. The control element thus cen-
enstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342-43 (1996)).
125. See generally FouCAULrsupra note 52, at 89-96; FouCAUL, supra note 32, at 195-228.
126. These might include rating agencies, including those who can obtain data that is already in
circulation and those which can coerce data because of the perceived legitimacy of the gathering
and judging that the organization produces. Consider in this sense the country assessments of both
Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty.org, and of the International Monetary Fund, http://
www.imf.org.
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ters on the system aspects of surveillance. This system aspect forms the most visible
basis of the regulatory function of surveillance. Systems reify control based on the
elements of information gathered and judgments privileged on the basis of the val-
ues framework through which surveillance is elaborated. Content, technique, and
discipline conflate and find expression through surveillance framework, thus pro-
viding the means for enforcing the regulatory ends of surveillance.
This control element has both an upstream and a downstream vector. The
upstream vector encompasses elements of internal institutional control-that is,
of self-control. The object is internal discipline. The beneficiaries of this form of
surveillance are the internal stakeholders of the organization-employees and of-
ficers or organizations-or political subdivision-the bureaucrats and other staff
that work for the apparatus of state. But the object also benefits external stake-
holders closely associated with the organization-investors in the private sector
and voters in the public sector.
The origins of the techniques and normative basis may develop at one or
more levels. For example, it may be developed internally by the entity engaged in
surveillance.'27 Or it may develop by the community of entities for which surveil-
lance is meant to aid in internal governance and to discipline the community of
entities into privileging a uniform set of norms reflected in the objects of surveil-
lance and the data sets monitored.2 ' It might also be developed by a superior pub-
127. The usual example is the internal monitoring systems of public corporations. See, e.g., DONALD
A. MARCHAND ET AL., MAKING THE INVISIBLE VISIBLE: How COMPANIES WIN WITH THE RIGHT IN-
FORMATION, PEOPLE AND IT (2001). See also Lowenstein,supra note 124. Usually tied to that internal
monitoring are notions of stakeholder monitoring of corporate activity. See Larry Cati Backer, The
Duty to Monitor: Emerging Obligations of Outside Lawyers and Auditors to Detect and Report Corpo-
rate Wrongdoing Beyond the Federal Securities Laws, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 919 (2003), reprinted in 53
DEF. L.J. 671 (2004) (focusing on monitoring obligations of outside auditors and corporate counsel).
Recently, stakeholder monitoring has begun to extend well beyond the usual group of shareholders
and professional advisors. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate
Governance: The Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795 (2007).
128. The usual example is the trade associations to which members of a particular industry may
belong, and which may, for the benefit of all of its members, collect data for private or public con-
sumption. See generally LEONARD H. LYNN & TIMOTHY J. McKEOWN, ORGANIZING BuSINESS: TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICA AND JAPAN (1988). In this light, consider the National Retail Federation,
which "is the world's largest retail trade association, with membership that comprises all retail
formats and channels of distribution." National Retail Federation, Home Page, http://nrf.org/ (last
visited Feb. 28, 2008). See also National Retail Federation, Mission Statement, http://nrf.org/
modules.php ?name= Pages&sp-id = 146&pmenu-id = &mntype= 1 (last visited Feb.28, 2008). Its
associated NRF Foundation "conducts industry research, develops education and workforce de-
velopment programs, and promotes retailing as a career destination." Id. The research includes
industry benchmarks, demographic data, and public policy analysis. See NRF Foundation, Indus-
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lic regulatory community,2 9 or by private regulatory organizations with influence
over an important segment of the surveillance entity's business.'3 ° The techniques,
scope, focus, and normative framework of surveillance will differ depending on
the origins and control of the surveillance framework. Surveillance becomes com-
plicated when an entity internalizes multiple, partial scope surveillance frame-
works.
The downstream element encompasses elements of external control by/through
others. The object is external discipline. The beneficiaries of surveillance in this
form include a number of actors. One class of beneficiaries are political communi-
ties-home state, host state, local communities, and supranational communities.
Control systems originate in statute. Another group of beneficiaries includes outside
stakeholders, including labor, lenders, and trade creditors. Downstream control sys-
tems originate in contract. The contract basis of observation permits the participa-
tion of a host of private actors. These include affinity groups, for example civil society
and non-governmental organizations. The origins of the techniques and normative
try Research, http://www.nrf.com/content/default.asp?folder=foundation&file=research.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2008). The last is particularly interesting, as a group of "accurate statistical infor-
mation that informs legislators, the media, and other decisions makers how their actions will im-
pact consumers, retailers, and the economy." Id.
129. An example can be found in the various money laundering acts that have become a staple of
regulation in many countries. These tend to impose on banks a substantial body of surveillance
and reporting obligations with respect to certain financial transactions (but not all such transac-
tions) to which the state gaze is turned. "In sum, anti-money laundering and terrorist financing
initiatives have provided political impetus for many jurisdictions to increase the monitoring and
responsibilities of banks, to exchange financial information with other countries, and even to allow
tax authorities to access financial information reported for money laundering purposes." Suzanne
Walsh, Note, Taxation Of Cross-Border Interest Flows: The Promises And Failures Of The European
Union Approach, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 251, 289 (2005). See also Joseph J. Norton & Heba
Shems, Money Laundering Law And Terrorist Financing: Post-September 11 Responses - Let Us
Step Back And Take A Deep Breath?, 36 INT'L LAW. 103 (2002).
130. Product certification programs, based on contractual arrangements under which corpora-
tions or other merchants may display a logo indicating certification of compliance with any one of
a number of requirements with respect to, for example, the use of recycled paper products, or the
payment of a living wage, verified through a program of self reporting and monitoring of compli-
ance. For an example of the mechanics of product certification, see Fair Trade Certified, About
Fair Trade, http://transfairusa.org/content/about/index.php. Fair Trade Certification "guarantees
consumers that strict economic, social and environmental criteria were met in the production and
trade of an agricultural product. Fair Trade Certification is currently available in the U.S. for cof-
fee, tea and herbs, cocoa and chocolate, fresh fruit, flowers, sugar, rice, and vanilla. TransFair USA
licenses companies to display the Fair Trade Certified label on products that meet strict interna-
tional Fair Trade standards." Id.
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basis of this form of surveillance may develop at one or more levels, in a manner that
parallels that in upstream disclosure.
An issue common to both upstream and downstream surveillance systems in-
volves generation versus transmission. Both upstream and downstream surveillance
systems distinguish between generation and transmission of information, either as
"raw data" or "judgment." Not all data/information generated is transmitted. For
example, data generated for internal management may not all be made available to
government regulators. Not all data/information transmitted is redelivered in the
same form or with the same content to different sets of recipients. For example, in-
ternal financial accounting systems may differ from financial reporting under Reg.
S-X (SEC).3 Moreover, not all data/information transmitted is generated from the
same source. For example, in the securities industry, data generators may be differ-
ent from data bundlers (analysts).' Lastly, both upstream and downstream surveil-
lance systems distinguish between passive and active elements. This invokes the
power element of surveillance. Active elements require information and may affect
its meaning, content, and scope. Passive elements do not. Yet, both affect the sub-
stantive element of surveillance. Insiders seeking information for the attainment of
management goals will understand data in a way different from insiders seeking
information for the attainment of production goals.
V. SURVEILLANCE AS GOVERNANCE
"The proliferation of quantitative measures of performance is a significant
social trend that is fundamental to accountability and governance; it can initiate
sweeping changes in status systems, work relations, and the reproduction of
inequality."'33 That idea, so well understood in the traditional social science litera-
ture, also has significant implications for political governance. Consider the com-
plex of power issues involved in the construction of transnational transparency
regimes of financial markets. Entities like the International Monetary Fund and
131. See, e.g., Nilabhra Bhattacharya et al., Empirical Evidence on Recent Trends in Pro Forma
Reporting, 18 AccT. HORIZONS 27, 28 (2004) (noting the arguments in favor of non GAAP pro
forma reporting as a means to "demystify complex accounting disclosures and provide a clearer
picture of the 'core earnings' that they expect to persist in future periods"). The results are even
more pronounced between tax accounting and financial accounting regimes. See Celia Whitaker,
Bridging the Book-Tax Accounting Gap, 115 YALE L.J. 680 (2005).
132. This is likely the result under the new MiFID directive as it is transposed into the national
law of the Member States in the European Union. See Backer, supra note 50.
133. Espel & Sauder, supra note 56, at 2.
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World Bank "have found themselves drawn into battles with a range of transna-
tional, multinational, domestic, and international authorities over the production
of financial information and the diffusion of financial information." '134
In this aspect, surveillance is felt as gouvernmentalit6, a linking of governance
with the techniques of its power. 35 Policing appears to have become a primary
focus of governance. In this respect, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX"), 3 6 for ex-
ample, can be considered an excellent example of gouvernmentalit6. It sought to
legislate an architecture of corporate discipline, and from that discipline, to de-
velop and impose substantive behavior norms tied to the forms of externally im-
posed self-discipline.' That architecture of corporate discipline-essentially
hierarchical, continuous, and integrated within the core of the institutional gover-
nance architecture,'38 like Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon,'39 defines a structure of
information gathering centrally focused on corporate directors who are required
to "see" everything. Yet these seers are themselves "seen" by the ultimate regula-
tor. That ultimate regulator, the federal government, selects the data to be
gathered,4 ° deploys corporate outsiders to monitor internal surveillance efficien-
134. Margaret Hansen, The Global Promotion of Transparency in Emerging Markets, 9 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 63, 64 (2003) ("These political battles cast a critical light on seemingly apolitical as-
sumptions that motivate much of the theoretical rationale for international governance strategies
inspired by the goal of a transparent global financial system.").
135. Foucault, supra note 6, at 67-71 ("One of the most notable features of governmentality re-
search has been its investigation of power 'beyond the state,' that is, with the tactics, techniques
and technologies which configure apparently 'non-political' sites like the firm or the school as
spaces of power."); Wendy Larner & William Walters, Introduction: Global Governmentality, in
GLOBAL GOVERNMENTALITY: GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL SPACES 1, 1 (Wendy Larner & William
Walters eds., 2004) [hereinafter GLOBAL GOVERNMENTALITY].
136. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 8.
137. In its essence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is about disclosure. Crafted by Congress in the
aftermath of financial collapses at corporations like Enron, Global Crossing and WorldCom,
the new law establishes the framework for a new regime of accountability by public companies
in the areas of financial reporting and disclosure, audits, conflicts of interest and governance.
Jenny B. Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley: Determining How to Comply with the New Federal
Disclosure Law for Corporations Won't be Easy, ABA J. 44 (Feb. 2003).
138. For a description of the architecture of surveillance generally, see Backer, supra note 55. For
a discussion of the surveillance within the SOX architecture focusing on the monitoring obliga-
tions of auditors and outside counsel, see Backer, supra note 127.
139. JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, OR, THE INSPECTION HousE, (1787), reprinted in THE PANOP-
TICON WRITINGs 29, 29-95 (Miran Bolovi ed., Verso 1995) (1791).
140. Thus, the focus of securities law tends to gravitate to the nature and quality of disclosure as
a proxy for the underlying values such disclosure represents. Disclosure-the techniques of the
gaze, substitute for the traditional formal concentration on substantive outcomes. Surveillance
becomes the means of governance and law serves as its mechanics. An excellent recent example is
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 15:1
cies, defines the boundaries of effective analysis (that is of analysis with legal ef-
fects), and selects the judgment to be made from certain clusters of information,
but not from others. 4' Corporate insiders, like Bentham's theoretical prisoners,
can most effectively and economically "always feel themselves as if under inspec-
tion, at least as standing a great chance of being so.' ' 1 Yet, at the same time, "the
emerging matrixes of surveillance and control, more clearly revealed and articu-
lated by SOX, also reveals something far more significant: A shift from a market
to a governmental system for developing behavior norms within firms and for
disciplining actors who violate those norms.""'
Gouvernmentalit6 thus implicates the consequences of adjustment of ele-
ments of the normative, informatics, and control aspects of surveillance. In a
sense, it describes lawmaking in a new form.'44 "Since the dissolution of the geo-
politics of the Cold War the security politics of global liberal governance has come
to depend extensively upon risk, insurance, surveillance, criminalisation and the
provided over the debates concerning disclosure of executive compensation in the aftermath of the
Disney-Ovitz litigation. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Final Rule: Executive Compen-
sation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 228. 229 et al.). For a discussion of the Disney-Ovitz litigation, see Harvey L. Pitt, The Chang-
ing Standards by Which Directors Will Be Judged, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 5-7 (2005) (reviewing the
Disney litigation in light of the prevalent issue of executive compensation in corporate America);
Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions-Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 271, 274 (2ooo) (examining the Disney cases as they relate to the growing
problems with executive compensation in an "era of performance-based pay"); Larry Cata Backer,
Director Independence and the Duty of Loyalty: Race, Gender, Class and the Disney-Ovitz Litigation,
79 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 1011 (2005) (considering the duty of loyalty issues in compensation cases like
that involved in the Disney-Ovitz litigation).
141. This becomes clear from the continuing refinements of the surveillance structures imposed
through SOX. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Commission, Definition of the Term Significant
Deficiency, 72 Fed. Reg. 44924 (Aug. 9, 2007) (refining the meaning of the term "significant defi-
ciency" for purposes of the Commission's rules implementing Section 302 and Section 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the reporting obligations)).
142. BENTHAM,supra note 139, at 43. "What is also of importance is, that for the greatest propor-
tion of time possible, each man should actually be under inspection. This is material in all cases,
that the inspector may have the satisfaction of knowing, that the discipline actually has the effect
which it is designed to have: and it is more particularly material in such cases where the inspector,
besides seeing that they conform to such standing rules as are prescribed, has more or less frequent
occasion to give them such transient and incidental directions as will require to be given and en-
forced, at the commencement at least of every course of industry." Id. at 44.
143. See Backer, supra note 55, at 331.
144. For a discussion of one form of this new information-based regulatory system, see Bradley
C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking,
Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEo. L.J. 257 (2000-2001).
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vernacular of street architecture to shape rational behaviour by empowering secu-
rity-conscious subjectivities.'14 5 Regulation presents itself, in its new form, as an
inversion of traditional regulation. Law is not supported by surveillance as a me-
chanics of enforcement. Instead, the mechanics of enforcement are supported by
law that serves as the mechanics of surveillance as a substantive pronouncement.
Law, as surveillance, is thus transformed into judgments derived from what is
chosen to be observed, recorded, analyzed, packaged, and constituted as reality,
which produces legal, social, political, and economic effects. One encounters here
regulation beyond the state and beyond politics.
Gouvernmentalit6 also serves as a bridge between surveillance as technique and
the systemic replication of private desire in collective action. In this aspect, one fo-
cuses on the consent of the actors in systems of surveillance used to reinforce or ar-
ticulate normative systems of power and behavior. "Governing people, in the broad
meaning of the word, governing people is not a way to force people to do what the
governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and con-
flicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the
self is constructed or modified by himself."' 46 Thomas Lemke'47 notes that "the anal-
ysis of gouvernmentalit6 does not only take into account 'breaks' or 'gaps' between
program and technology, but also inside each of them-viewing them not as signs
of their failure but as the very condition of their existence." Thus, "government re-
fers to a continuum, which extends from political government right through to
forms of self-regulation, namely technologies of the self."'48
Gouvernmentalit6 can thus also be understood in its Aristotelian sense, as a
necessary self-replication of normative understanding and techniques from out of
the individual to the collective.'49 A full array of issues commonly understood as
democratic accountability and democratic action are also bundled in this regard.
These may be understood as norms and procedure and touch on issues of who ought
to compel surveillance, who may be monitored, the complications of self-surveil-
145. Michael Dillon, The Security of Governance, in GLOBAL GOVERNMENTALITY,supra note 135, at
76, 80.
146. Michel Foucault, About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dart-
mouth, 21 POL. THEORY 198, 204 (Mark Blasius ed., 1993).
147. Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality and Critique, Paper presented at the Rethinking
Marxism Conference at the University of Amherst (MA) (September 21-24, 2000), http://www
.thomaslem keweb.de/publikationen/Foucault,%20Governmentality,%20and%20Critique
%201V-2.pdf, at 9-10.
148. Id. at 12.
149. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/6762.
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lance, the connection between monitor and monitored, beneficiaries along the
stream of conveyance of data/information from construction to broadcast, and po-
litical power and democratic accountability (that is of private recourse to the norma-
tive framework of public accountability). Indeed, the techniques that constitute
surveillance empower political action against the apparatus of political authority in
states, as well as enabling that power to extend its reach. It has been used as both a
method of participation in and of resistance to governance. For example, the control
of crowds and mass protests through the techniques of surveillance has been met by
evolving techniques of resistance based on the same techniques deployed to control
crowds.' The techniques developed for crowd control-and thus for the control
(or management) of political expression acceptable to the governing ideology
(whether democratic, Marxist, theocratic, or otherwise) have been adapted by those
who seek to resist that control.' Likewise, global NGOs have used surveillance and
disclosure as methods of enforcing corporate regulatory regimes between multina-
tional corporations, like Gap, Inc. and its global suppliers.'52 Surveillance thus sharp-
ens and disperses regulatory power in new ways. And individual participation is
both broadened and made more complex.
Ultimately, surveillance here in its normative/regulatory guise confronts the is-
sues: Is there an ideal from which deviations can be judged? And at what point is
deviation severe enough to merit discipline and correction? The answer increasingly
appears to be no ... and yes! There is a diminishing likelihood that a single ideal
will serve as the basis for constructing the fact set from which deviation ought to be
judged. However, as governance systems fracture and governance power seeps from
political to ethnic, economic, religious, and affective communities, which together
form multi-layered and networked communities, it is likely that the techniques of
surveillance will serve as the connection between individual self-constitution and
the constitution of governance systems in its substantive and disciplinary aspects.
150. One of the techniques recently developed by protest and political/social action movements,
has been "swarming," "the dispersion of command among many small, autonomous units." Insti-
tute for Applied Autonomy, Defensive Surveillance: Lessons From the Republican National Conven-
tion, in SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY: TECHNOLOGICAL POLITICS AND POWER IN EVERYDAY LIFE 167,
168 (Torin Monahan ed., 2006).
151. "This is accomplished by 'comms affinity groups,' which are collections of technically savvy
activists who are responsible for intelligence gathering and information dissemination during pro-
tests." Id. at 169. Observation and communication is accomplished by the fusion of a variety of
technologies: "two-way radios, cell phones, the Internet, radio, and word of mouth. During the
RNC, comms groups relied on cell phone text messaging to an extent previously unrealized dur-
ing highly anticipated mass mobilizations." Id.
152. See Backer, supra note 108.
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VI. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
Surveillance, understood as an aggregation of techniques, values, judgments
and relationships, thus acquires a complexity belied by the traditional single-
minded, state-centered, democratic-value-enhancing "model" of surveillance as
mere technique, that is, as "mere means." Surveillance has leaped the borders of
the private and soft law (culture, mores, morals) within which it had been con-
fined. The techniques now serve not as a proxy for or enhancement of governance,
but as governance itself. Within the public sphere, that is the sphere of political
governance, the consequences are significant, especially for law. In a surveillance
governance culture, the relationship between law and surveillance is inverted.
While traditional political communities assumed surveillance as a means to the
enforcement of law, in the emerging surveillance culture law is the means through
which surveillance is enforced. Law no longer serves its traditional function either
as an organic repository of the regulation of a political community or as the posi-
tive expression of the will of the political community as legitimately enacted
through its representatives in government.'53
But law is also separated from surveillance in the emerging culture. Surveil-
lance is fractured and partial, engaged in by every organ of public life and imple-
mented through individual action, whether or not people are acting in an individual
or representative capacity. States have privatized information gathering,"' interna-
tional organizations seek to base a new international legal order on surveillance and
self-monitoring,'55 and private entities seek to utilize monitoring and self-monitoring
regimes as a basis for economic and social regulation of relations between themselves
and their various factors of production. 15 6 Separated from the institutions of political
communities in its social aspects, surveillance has become naturalized within the
social culture. It is becoming the means through which law is expressed. And from
this, surveillance has produced a fracturing of power, even as it has changed the na-
ture of law. Foucault's prediction that power and law would be expressed in different
ways in a world that has been able to move beyond symbolic utterance to surveil-
lance, that is, would be expressed through technique, is coming to pass.
153. For a discussion of the relationship between these two conceptualizations of law within tra-
ditional law based political communities, see Backer, supra note 31.
154. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 8.
155. See Backer, Multinational Corporations, supra note 29.
156. See Larry Cati Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global
Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739 (2007).
157. FouCAULT, supra note 32, at 145.
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Thus, surveillance serves as an expression of the apparatus of the constitution of
the community observed. It helps solidify a "closed system, internally complete; yet
... also [one that] communicates, as a system, with the public national and supra-
national legal systems through which it may sometimes find expression, and that
may serve as sources of norms.""15 But the unbundling of surveillance as these clus-
ters of actions and judgments among multiple overlapping and sometimes conflict-
ing closed systems (political, social, economic, national, and transnational
communities) provides evidence of the emergence not only of techniques of gover-
nance, but of the complicity of self-governance and the proliferation of forms of
governance beyond both the state and political frameworks previously privileged.15 9
For example, multinational corporations serve as the locus of a non-state regu-
latory power. In my earlier work, 6' for example, I sought to sketch out the way in
which fractured and networked non-state power is coalescing into functionally dif-
ferentiated, porous yet autonomous units of governance beyond the nation-state. 6'
"There are four principle [sic] actors: (i) corporations and other enterprises; (ii) ele-
ments of civil society, primarily the great global economic and human rights non-
governmental organizations (NGOs); (iii) media; and (iv) consumers of the products
of the corporations, civil society actors and the media, including consumers, custom-
ers, the investment community and financial markets. These actors have funda-
mentally adverse interests, are each dependent on the other, and derive authority
from their respective interactions. '162 This regulatory system is grounded, in large
158. Backer, supra note 156, at 1748. Seealso id. at 1749 ("It is a lawmaking bounded by functional
differentiation, that is, by lawmaking limited to a particular and specifically bounded/defined
field of conduct related to the purposes for which the lawmaking community functions-applying
to overlapping groups of people within multiple political, social, and ethnic communities.").
159. See Teubner, supra note 23, at 13-15; see also Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner,
Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MIcH. J.
INT'L L. 999 (2004).
160. Backer, supra note 156, at 1739.
161. This closed system is based on contract rather than legislation (perhaps now better under-
stood as a form of contract with political and social dimension) and is meant to substitute for, or
supplement, or bridge lapses in regulation by local, state and supra-national organs. Like most
political systems, it is a functionally differentiated system. But while political systems are function-
ally differentiated along traditional substantive political bounds and limited by the territorial prin-
ciple of the nation-state, the boundaries of this system are inherent in the nature of the relations
among the actors. In the specific system analyzed, that boundary was marked by the limits of the
relationship between a multi-national corporation and its suppliers and supply chain. See id.
162. Id. at 1748-49. See also id. at 1751-52 ("Private law making and private enforcement are pos-
sible because the system is built on a closed set of relationships among actors that, in the aggregate,
produce norms, sustain viable systems of monitoring and communication among functionally dis-
tinct actors, and facilitate enforcement with reference to the rules generated by the system itself.").
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part, on surveillance among the actors in the closed system.'63 The surveillance is
internal to the multinational corporation and its principal constituencies (investors
and consumers),'164 and also exists as overlapping circuits of observation between the
principal participants in this regulatory matrix-multinational and supplier, 165 sup-
plier and non-governmental organization, 61 non-governmental organization and
the media,' 67 and each of these actors and the state and international political orga-
nizations. 16 Governance surveillance thus constitutes both a reproduction of indi-
vidual governance'69 and a technique of power. Governance surveillance is thus now
163. The basic system characteristics include: "(i) an essential role of private law through contract;
(ii) transparency, disclosure and its use by elements of civil society; (iii) a connection between civil
society and media; (iv) a connection between media and public, consumers, public law enforce-
ment institutions; and (v) a connection between public and internal corporate investigation and
sanction apparatus." Id. at 1752.
164. Because of the importance of these actors, and the reactive nature of their role in the system,
the control of customer/investor/markets information is critical. This comes as no surprise-
modern securities markets are based on the importance of markets for information. Informa-
tion management becomes as important as development, implementation and enforcement of
behavior norms through contract.
Id. at 1760.
165. The basic structure of coercive surveillance-self monitoring, reporting, and monitoring
from outside with respect to those matters identified by the multinational corporation, are con-
tained in the contract between the multinational and the supplier. The contract, in this respect,
constitutes the institutional relationship between the entities on a basis far more extensive than
merely economic. It contains social and political dimensions as well, the functioning of which is a
function of surveillance and response systems. In the case of Wal-Mart, those norms are embodied
in the contract and the "Standards for Suppliers." See id. at 1754-56.
166. "The most visible role of civil society is to monitor compliance with both public law and the
contractual obligations of multinational with its stakeholders. In the context of supplier agree-
ments, this requires monitoring the factories with contractual relations with Wal-Mart. Monitor-
ing is difficult and expensive." Id. at 1758. This monitoring is accomplished both by interviewing
the actors and otherwise obtaining information that must be disclosed to public shareholders and
other constituencies.
167. The media serves as a critical factor in the effectiveness of private monitoring. And it serves
as the most efficient means of communication among all of the actors within the private
regulatory system. It is also a player in its own right, achieving substantive results through its
power to choose among items of information for publication.
Id. at 1749.
168. These political entities produce their own forms of regulatory surveillance, discussed above,
applicable especially against a pubic corporation whose securities are registered in the United
States, like Wal-Mart. See id. at 1741.
169. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE (Peter L. Phillips Simpson trans., University of
North Carolina Press, 1997). Recall that Aristotle laid the modern foundation for a theory of state
based on reproduction of governance from the lowest and least significant grouping in society (the
family) through the grandest empire. See id. This methodology of embedded replication of cultur-
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structured within both public (law) and private (contract) relationships. The objects
of these systems are both states and non-state actors, each of which may be com-
pelled or encouraged by a variety of actors and stakeholders.
As a consequence, surveillance has become ubiquitous, a mirror on self and
social organization, a reflection of the techniques and self-constitution of power,
and an expression of normative values which bound those communities thus con-
stituted. Again, the autonomous supplier chain contract based system of large
multinationals provides a window onto the character of this consequence.
Wal-Mart gets the best of both worlds-it purchases low cost sup-
plies until the cost of the supplies includes a dip in economic good-
will, at which point Wal-Mart sanctions its supplier. This repairs
the damage to Wal-Mart's economic goodwill after it has received
the benefit of low-cost supplies. It has externalized, to some extent,
the costs of monitoring, by relying on the efforts of civil society. But
civil society is better off as well. Wal-Mart is good for the business
of civil society as long as Wal-Mart cannot perfectly manage its
suppliers in accordance with its own standards. The media is better
off as well. The dynamic relationship between supplier, multi-na-
tional and civil society generates information that can be packaged
as "news." Production of this sort of news is profitable for media
entities and reinforces the media's role as information gatekeeper
and authoritative source of "facts." Non-traditional media (internet
and other sources) also profit. Their ability to transmit information
about multinationals from elements of civil society reinforces their
own legitimacy and strengthens network ties between them and
civil society organizations. The suppliers are better off as well,
gambling that the imperfect process of inspection and audit will
protect them. But ironically, even the workers are better off. The
standards themselves, and the fear of enforcement, change the
base-line for the treatment of workers across the board.1 70
ally distinct patterns of governance is not confined to the West. Confucian notions of family, state,
hierarchy, obedience and harmony also conflate (or assume a necessary replicating articulation) of
a primal form across governance divisions whether formally constituted (the state) or informally
constituted. See BERTHRONG, supra note 66, at 129-30.
170. Backer, supra note 156, at 1781-82.
GLOBAL PANOPTICISM
Surveillance has morphed from an incident of governance to the basis of gov-
ernance itself. It is both government (apparatus) and governmentality (its self-
conception and complicity, the prisoner becomes his own keeper). In this sense,
surveillance has become the new regulatory mechanism. And law is becoming its
servant. And the state, either as the traditionally conceived apex of political order,
or as the repository of large aggregations of power within an international state
system, now serves as a (but not the) nexus point for the regulatory power of tech-
nique. It is in this sense that we can speak of the "death" of the "state" or the
"rise" of a transnational political system, or the "death" of the public/private di-
vide or even the construction of non-public autopoietic systems. 7'
I have suggested illustrations of these propositions. The examples I have
drawn on suggest that surveillance governance has begun to form patterns of ex-
pression that merit additional study. Among the emerging patterns are municipal
and formal surveillance. These systems appear to be distinguished by their formal
public law based characteristics. They are grounded in law, and their formal as-
pects appear to have an upstream vector (surveillance proceeds from lower to
higher authorities for the benefit of the higher formal, and legally constituted,
authority) and are, as a function of their basis in law, coerced. Examples of this
form of surveillance system might include systems of corporate regulation." 2 They
acquire a global and transborder dimension in emerging global systems of volun-
tary corporate best practices and "social responsibility.'
73
Another emerging pattern of surveillance governance is transnational and in-
formal surveillance. These systems appear to be distinguished by their informal,
that is, functional, based characteristics. They are grounded in contract rather than
in law and may have both an upstream and horizontal set of control vectors. They
are sometimes coerced (in the context of contract obligations) but maintained
through systems of surveillance incentives. Examples of such private transnational
systems include supplier chain surveillance systems, like those founded on the social
171. See, e.g., Franqois Ewald, The Law of Law, in AuTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEw APPROACH TO LAW
AND SOCIETY 36, 39-41 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) (examining its relationship to traditional
theories of public law, especially the theories of Hans Kelson); Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social
System, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 136 (1989).
172. While the focus of this article has been on American corporate governance, and specifically
with the example of SOX, supra note 8, the pattern also appears in other corporate governance
systems, principally those emerging in Europe. See Backer, supra note 50.
173. See supra note 65 and accompanying text for an example of the work of the OECD in this
respect.
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and economic relations between multinational corporations and their suppliers.'
But in its more horizontal dimension include the rising systems of product certifica-
tion programs'75 or private systems of performance evaluation, for example public
and private global security firms and bond-rating agencies. 76
A third emerging pattern of surveillance governance includes transnational
and formal surveillance systems. These systems appear to be distinguished by
their hybrid characteristics. They tend to involve public-private or public multi-
level partnerships, grounded in both law and in contract, with downstream vec-
tors (information proceeds from the greater legally constituted entity to the less
formally constituted or public entity, for the benefit of both the disciplining of the
greater entity but the benefit of the less formally constituted entity). Surveillance
may be both law and contract based. These surveillance systems tend to focus on
states as the objects of surveillance and public-private entities as the monitor. Ex-
amples might include the World Bank, especially in its anti-corruption and tech-
nical assistance programs.7 7 It might also include the International Monetary
Fund, especially its country surveillance programs and the surveillance elements
of its conditional lending programs . 8 These systems all share something in com-
mon-the effectuation of broadly-based behavior aspirational goals with very
specific and concrete application through regimes of monitoring, disclosure, ob-
servation, intervention, and open-textured stakeholder intervention. Information
is used by the principals to the governance relationship but is dependent on the
participation of multiple actors in monitoring, reporting and reshaping. Thus, the
IMF's lending programs require the active participation of governments, busi-
ness, civil society, and the media to create an open-textured, constant state of vigi-
lance grounded in the norms that constitute the conditions to the loan.
174. See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text (looking at the example of the system set up
by Wal-Mart).
175. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The
Case of Forestry, 17 EuR. J. INT'L LAW 47 (2006). See also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
176. See generally Katharyne Mitchell & Katherine Beckett, Securing the Global City: Crime, Consult-
ing, Risk, and Ratings in the Production of Urban Space, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 75 (2008).
177. See supra notes 82, 134 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
"The policing of a postmodern world emerges as a complex set of visual and
semiotic practices, an expanding spiral of mediated control."'79 Surveillance, what
we are coming to understand as that complex of techniques and assumptions, is
assuming a central place within this policing. And indeed, as this article suggests,
policing is quickly replacing law (either organic or positive law) as the framework
through which collectives (the state, the corporation, and religion, to name the
most well-known actors) govern. This article has sought to unpack the complex
characteristics of surveillance and to suggest the ways in which it has acquired
normative significance. Surveillance is both shaped by the normative assumptions
of the community from which determinations to harvest information springs and
also shapes those assumptions in the act of harvesting. A society that chooses
among items of information to be harvested reifies and privileges those forms of
data and invests each with meaning that lead implicitly to judgment in which
privileged information counts for more than the rest.
Even the concept of information is subject to interrogation. Much that passes
for fact is judgment, which the act of harvesting is meant to reinforce. The descrip-
tor "fact" or "data" is sometimes a veil used to hide judgments and objects hidden
within assumptions and presumptions that together constitute the "thing" identi-
fied as "fact" or "data. 80 Concepts like "race," "ethnicity," and "religion" are perhaps
more legitimately contestable "conclusions" or "suppositions" than they are concrete
"facts" or "data." Yet a determination to "gather" information about each can follow
only from a conclusion that such a thing exists and is bound by a certain set of char-
acteristics. Likewise, the act of harvesting itself suggests the characteristics of the
things harvested and confirms power relationships among those to be harvested, the
harvester, and the holder of the data harvested. Information itself serves social, cul-
tural, and institutional functions. Conversations about surveillance serve indirectly
to suggest societal decision making on the meaning of language, the objectification
of intangible conditions (and status), the characteristics of group membership, and
the assignment of ownership of data. This data can now simultaneously serve social,
political, and economic roles in the hands of both private and public actors who
serve as informatics stakeholders.
179. Jeff Ferrell & Neil Websdale, Materials for Making Trouble, in MAKING TROUBLESUpra note 116,
at3, 15.
180. For a general discussion of veiling in its political and legal context, see Larry Cat Backer,
Forward: Constituting Nations-Veils, Disguises, Masquerades, 20 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 329 (2002).
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It follows that information and control function together as technique and as its
framework. The control elements focus on the systems aspects of surveillance. Sys-
tems, in this case, are understood to encompass both the ministerial constructs
through which surveillance techniques are structured and given effect, and the insti-
tutions that operate such systems. Information is power. That is well understood. But
information farming is more power still. The control of those farming operations
provides a source of power. It also provides a technique for controlling challenges to
such power. The great contribution of twentieth century totalitarian systems to
American democracy, perversely enough, has been its understanding of the utility of
information as a means to power and its retention. The surveillance cultures of post-
revolutionary Cuba'81 appear again in the interstices of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Control implicates governance. Surveillance suggests a new basis of gover-
nance-one that is not grounded on the old constructs of positive law imposed
through expressions of the will of the community or its sovereign institutions. In-
stead, governance assumes a more complex form, one in which the traditional
boundaries of community become much more fluid and porous, even as communi-
ties become more rigidly defined and differentiated. Yet, the caution sounded is
worth remembering as this inquiry has ended. That caution ought to remind those
who deepen and broaden surveillance regimes as the modern vehicle for regulation
that this form of control may have significant effects on the nature and functioning
of the American republic and on the nature of the relationships of individuals to
each other and to the institutions that may assert some coercive power over their
choices, outlooks, and positions. "By requiring citizens to live in glass houses with-
out curtains, totalitarian societies deny their status as individuals and 'this transfor-
mation of a man from subject to object is experienced as shame." 82 Surveillance
regimes, as law beyond the state, are here to stay. Their complexities, manipulability,
and regulatory effects should not be underestimated.
181. See Backer, supra note 127, at 921 n.7:
It is with some irony that one can access on the official website of the Marxist-Socialist govern-
ment of Cuba the suggestion that the American government has attempted to create its own
version of the revolutionary neighborhood committees for the defense of the revolution-Comi-
tas de Defensa de la Revoluci6n. These committees were established by the Cuban government
after 1959 to enlist citizens in the monitoring and reporting of their fellow citizens in the cause
of the Cuban revolution, that is, against acts of counterrevolutionary terrorism.
182. RosENsupra note 5, at 112 (quoting in part, MILAN KUNDERA, TESTAMENTS BETRAYED 261
(1995)).
